UKIP, from a single issue party to the radical right: real symptom, wrong diagnosis by Mondon, Aurelien
        
Citation for published version:
Mondon, A 2015, 'UKIP, from a single issue party to the radical right: real symptom, wrong diagnosis', TOR -
The Open Review of Social Sciences, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 25-27.
Publication date:
2015
Document Version
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 29. Jul. 2020
 In this Issue 
 ‘Child trafficking’ moral 
panic: blame, disrepute 
and loss 
 Placebo analgesia: 
what fMRI can tell us 
 “Geography…so what 
do you actually study?” 
 TOR Election 
Symposium 
 
 
Contact/call for papers 
torjournal@gmail.com 
 
 
 
We are delighted to present the first edition of – TOR: The 
Open Review for the Social Sciences 
 
 
- an open access journal led by 
students, for students at the South 
West Doctoral Training Centre 
(SWDTC) comprising the University 
of Bath, the University of Bristol 
and the University of Exeter. The 
journal supports students looking 
to publish their work, provides 
editorial experience to students 
who help run the journal, and 
establishes a cross-institutional 
network for peer review training 
and professional development. 
 
This journal began its journey to 
publication in 2014. As volunteer 
editors we hoped that an open 
access journal could provide fellow 
students a valuable resource for 
those critical academic activities, 
publishing and peer reviewing. We 
agreed that a student led journal 
could offer a supportive, collegiate 
framework for students new to the 
process of publication and peer 
review. Since then, and with the 
support of the SWDTC, we are 
excited to have overseen the 
production of this, the first issue of 
the journal. 
 
As an editoral board we would like 
to extend our thanks to Sonja Ho, 
Molly Conisbee and Joanna 
Williams as well as the academic 
staff at the SWDTC for supporting 
our endeavour. We would like to 
thank our colleagues who attended 
peer review training and submitted 
articles for publication, and to 
Susan Milner, Rajiv Sarin, Susan 
Kelly and Sue Timmis for leading p 
peer review workshops over the 
course of the year. We would also 
like to thank Mairi McLellan for her 
contribution to the design of the 
journal. Finally, we hope you will 
enjoy this first issue of the journal, 
and we all look forward to future 
editions and to watching the 
journal grow under students, 
present and future, at the SWDTC. 
 
With our best wishes, 
 
Benjamin Bowman, Katherine 
Evans, Harry Pitts, Ioannis Costas 
and Gwilym Owen, 
 
Editors 
Tor: The Open Review for the Social 
Sciences, SWDTC 
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’Child trafficking’ moral panic: blame, disrepute 
and loss 
  Alinka Gearon 
My background is in UK child protection social work practice in the statutory sector and working as 
an independent social work consultant. I am currently finishing my PhD at the University of Bath, 
exploring the experiences of young people who have been trafficked. My research interests lie in 
qualitative and child-focused research exploring children’s worlds, child protection and children’s 
rights. I am exploring how research which engages children directly can be integrated into social work 
education, social policy and practice. My PhD research methods have incorporated dynamic group 
work, arts-based methods, music and dance, to engage young people to express their voice. 
Abstract 
‘Child trafficking’ has recently been critically positioned 
within moral panic theory by authors such as Westwood 
(2010) and Cree et al. (2014) making links between 
historical and present day presentations of this social 
issue. This paper contributes to this discussion but is 
distinct in its central concern; how separated and 
moving children and young people experience the 
present UK ‘child trafficking’ framework, in the midst of 
moral panic. Moral panics create conditions of blame, 
disrepute and loss, which this paper explores in relation 
to ‘child trafficking’ policy and practice and considers 
the implications for trafficked children. (Non-
)contemporary concepts of childhood underpinning the 
‘child trafficking’ framework are examined, which posit 
children and childhood dichotomously as either 
innocent and lost, passive to abuse and wholly 
dependent on adult protection or as complicit, 
undeserving threats. In ‘child trafficking’ policy and 
practice, these constructs variably punish or ‘protect’ 
children, failing to address this group of children’s 
needs.   
 
In the current climate of moral panics about social 
phenomena that seemingly threaten our social fabric 
and moral order (Critcher, 2009) through ‘enacted 
melodramas’ (Wright, 2015), social work research 
needs to critically engage with ‘claims-makers’ (Clapton 
et al., 2013) and present alternative renderings of social 
problems. This paper argues that social work research is 
well placed to redress moral panics through its activity 
in engaging ethically with people who are marginalised 
with difficult social problems, without a voice, as the 
subjects of moral panics.  
 
Keywords: Child trafficking, moral panic, children, 
childhood. 
 
Introduction 
The interest in ‘child trafficking’ has grown globally 
since the first international convention to define 
trafficking in persons was established by the United 
Nations (UN) in 2000 in the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons. In a highly 
emotive and morally entrepreneurial fashion, member 
states were called into action as trafficking was 
presented as   
 
“One of the most egregious violations of human rights 
that the United Nations now confronts. It is widespread 
and growing...The fate of these most vulnerable people 
in our world is an affront to human dignity and a 
challenge to every State, every people and every 
community” (Kofi Annan, UN, 2004, p. iv). 
 
Since the ratification of the protocol in the UK in 2006, 
‘child trafficking’ has increasingly been exposed as a 
growing phenomenon, requiring a legal, policy, and 
practice response to the third most lucrative illicit 
trans-national industry (Haken, 2011) estimated at $32 
billion (ILO, 2005). ‘Child trafficking’ is a complex social 
issue with crosscutting policy contexts of economic and 
social policy, child protection, migration, human rights, 
internal security and crime-prevention (Craig et al., 
2007; Glind & Kooijmans, 2008).   
 
This paper asserts that the growing attention to ‘child 
trafficking’ and policy responses display many features 
of moral panics as defined by Cohen (1972) and 
developed further in its relevance to modern society by 
authors such as Goode and Ben-Yehuda (2009) and 
Tyler (2013). A key facet of moral panics is the hasty 
judgements of its subjects, as to who is moral and 
therefore ‘deserving’ or immoral and ‘underserving’. 
Such ‘oppositional categorising’ (Fook, 2013) creates a 
form of ‘othering’, by invoking judgements on who is to 
blame or praise, who gains or loses, who seeks fame or 
is held in disrepute? (Bodhi, 2005). This paper explores 
the conditions of blame, disrepute and loss in relation to 
‘child trafficking’ policy and practice, examines the 
underlying constructs of childhood underpinning these 
conditions and considers the implications for this group 
of children.  
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This paper, which critically analyses the ‘child 
trafficking’ policy and practice framework, draws upon 
my PhD research which explores young people’s 
experiences of ‘child trafficking’. Currently, no peer-
reviewed empirical studies in the UK give voice to 
trafficked children. My research aims to address this gap 
in the literature. The subjects of ‘child trafficking’ as 
well as separated and moving children are the focus of 
this paper, specifically in how they experience the UK 
‘child trafficking’ policy and practice framework. 
 
Modern Slavery 
The present attention and interest in ‘child trafficking’ 
displays many features of a moral panic, which Cohen 
(1972) in his seminal work defined as  
 
“A threat to societal values and interests; its nature is 
presented in a stylised and stereotypical fashion by the 
mass media; the moral barricades are manned by 
editors, bishops, politicians and other right-thinking 
people” (p. 9).  
 
Current media amplification of ‘modern slavery’ and 
rescue stories echo 19th century social purity 
campaigns to end the ‘white slave trade’ (Westwood, 
2010; Cree et al., 2014). The immorality of ‘child 
trafficking’ is often sensationalised by foregrounding 
sex trafficking in campaigning activities (O’Connell 
Davidson, 2011) and moral outrage is amplified through 
extensive media coverage of ‘child sex gangs’, as in the 
recent investigations in Telford, Rochdale and Oxford. 
Moral entrepreneurs (Cohen, 1972) or the ‘claims-
makers’ (Clapton et al., 2013) fuelling moral panics 
estimate the enormous scale of trafficking; ‘tips of 
icebergs’ are often quoted by ‘anti’-trafficking agencies; 
and both  government and NGO’s are keen to convey 
that figures of known trafficking cases are likely to be 
far higher (UNICEF, 2007; SOCA, 2012; IDMG, 2012; 
ATMG, 2012). 
 
Trafficking press releases attract the public’s 
awareness, the media, and consequently funding for 
various programmes. As O’Connell Davidson and 
Anderson (2006) critically observe, ‘trafficking’ has 
become ‘big business’ for middle class professionals, 
including researchers, politicians and lobbyists. The 
present ‘modern slavery’ moral panic appears to be 
driven by middle strata interest groups (Goode and Ben-
Yehuda, 2009), appropriating the issue for its own 
purposes. But who are the emerging ‘folk devils’ (Cohen, 
1972) or ‘revolting subjects’ (Tyler, 2013) in the ‘child 
trafficking’ moral panic? Beyond the obvious abhorrent 
actions of “extreme depravity” (BBC, 2013) of traffickers 
in abusing children, this paper considers through the 
themes of blame, disrepute and loss that the subjects, 
children and young people who cross social and 
physical borders, are cast as a threat to the moral order 
and scapegoated as “national abjects” (Tyler, 2013, p. 9). 
 
Blame 
The UK ‘child trafficking’ framework has two main 
approaches in policy and practice. The welfare approach 
aims to protect children referred to or defined as 
‘trafficked’ and the criminal justice approach focuses on 
immigration and criminal processes. In the UK, the 
predominant model adopted is the criminal justice 
approach due to policy-makers interpreting trafficking 
through criminal, immigration, and economic discourses. 
The Home Office has lead responsibility for ‘anti-
trafficking’ policy; the UK Human Trafficking Centre is 
situated under the National Crime Agency (whose main 
concern is organised immigration crime), and the UK 
Border Agency is the main agency dealing with referrals 
of ‘trafficking victims’. These immigration agencies 
make decisions if individuals referred to them are a 
‘victim of trafficking’ and accord them a formal label, 
presenting a clear conflict of interests.  
 
The criminal justice approach to trafficking with the 
rhetoric of prosecution to ‘combat’ the crime of 
trafficking is questionable given the extremely low 
numbers of traffickers actually prosecuted. Only 8 
convictions were secured in England and Wales for 
2011 “on a principal offence basis” (IDMG, 2012, p. 4).  
The structure and orientation of ‘child trafficking’ policy 
from a criminal and immigration lens has been 
problematized, objections have been raised about the 
Home Office not being the appropriate body to address 
the issue of children’s rights to protection who have 
been trafficked (ATMG, 2010; Office of the Children’s 
Commissioner, 2013). The construction of the UK ‘child 
trafficking’ framework within ‘illegal migration’ 
discourse can be seen as serving a justification by the 
state to control increasing migration with tightening of 
border controls rather than addressing the protection 
and needs of people who have been trafficked.  
 
The welfare approach in the UK ‘child trafficking’ 
framework focuses on protecting ‘victims of trafficking’ 
within the existing system of safeguarding and 
promoting the welfare of all children under the Children 
Acts 1989 and 2004. However, social workers working 
with potential child victims of trafficking are required to 
work closely with various agencies under a criminal 
justice approach where greater emphasis is placed on 
prosecution and punishment of associated crimes 
within ‘child trafficking’. Social workers have additional 
roles to their statutory duties under the Children Acts 
1989 and 2004, including referrals to the National 
Referral Mechanism (NRM) 1 , age assessments and 
assisting children with their immigration claims. The 
expectations of social workers to work closely with 
Home Office agencies raises the issue of complicity of 
social work practice with immigration policy 
(Humphries, 2004) and presents tensions in practice 
between the duty to provide protection  and the 
requirements of prosecution of crimes against the state, 
such as illegal immigration (Wade et al., 2005).  
 
The outcomes for children and young people are that 
very few are formally accepted as having been trafficked 
                                                 
1 The ascension of the  Modern Slavery Bill now includes a  
new statutory duty to refer to the NRM, despite objections 
being raised by various child agencies about its function not 
serving the child’s bests interests (for example  Office of the 
Children’s Commissioner’s response to the Modern Slavery 
Bill Evidence Review, 2013). 
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through the criminal justice model. At a national level 
372 children and young people were referred to the 
NRM in 2012 (UKHTC, 2012), but only 31% of children’s 
cases referred to NRM to date have been accepted and 
defined as formally ‘trafficked’ (ATMG, 2014), despite 
referring practitioners suspecting trafficking has taken  
place. Statistically, therefore, children suspected of 
having been trafficked are more likely to be treated 
punitively through an approach which places greater 
emphasis on immigration matters over child protection 
concerns. The focus on crimes against the state over and 
above the potential crimes committed against children 
can lead to a lack of protection and denial to access 
services to prevent trafficking.    
 
The concern for this group of children and young 
people is that the present construction of the UK ‘child 
trafficking’ framework invokes in practice a 
dichotomous approach of passive, deserving ‘victim of 
trafficking’ or a complicit, undeserving threat. 
Trafficked persons are constructed as involuntary 
‘victims’ who have been coerced in some way and 
smuggled migrants are constructed as voluntarily 
‘consenting’ to their migration. In practice, if a child is 
identified as having been trafficked (and statistically 
very few are), they are accorded special ‘victim’ status 
and can access specialist support and protection. A 
smuggled child migrant, in practice termed an 
‘unaccompanied asylum seeker,’ is likely to be seen as 
complicit and assigned responsibility for their situation. 
‘Consenting’ children are thus attributed blame for their 
circumstance and this moral stance determines a child’s 
legal category, asylum status, a lack of potential 
protection required in exploitative situations and 
subsequent access to specialist support. Children who 
are migrating alone, separated from their carers, are 
processed through the criminal justice model. They are 
fingerprinted, forensically interviewed and detained by 
immigration officials (11 Million, 2008), as criminals in 
“violation of state sovereignty” (UKBA, 2013, p.7) they 
are treated punitively through detention, imprisonment 
or deportation.  When ‘smuggled illegals’ are treated as 
“culpable and complicit actors” (Bhabha & Zard, 2006, p. 
6) both trafficking situations and addressing the abuse 
children experience may be overlooked. 
 
The demarcation of coercion and consent, as a key 
determinant between ‘trafficking’ and ‘smuggling’ 
highlights an oversimplified and false division within 
children’s complex migration experiences. Attributing 
choice and complicity to ‘smuggled’ children in the 
decisions to migrate can be contested. A common theme 
emerging in research with separated children is that 
young people have a lack of choice or awareness when 
they were sent abroad, they are not given a choice about 
whether to leave their families, and many do not know 
where they are going (Wirtz, 2009; Crawley, 2010a). 
‘Consent’ is attributed to children as a punitive 
approach to being complicit in illegal immigration and 
yet the notion of consent may not be a reliable indicator 
of the child’s circumstances. Consent and coercion can 
overlap, as can smuggling and trafficking experiences, 
so the axis of involuntary-victim and voluntary-threat is 
an oversimplified and false dichotomy. 
 
Disrepute 
Failings of the welfare approach in protecting children 
from exploitation have been highlighted in the ‘child sex 
grooming gangs’ in Rochdale, Telford, Derby and Oxford 
(BBC, 2012).  Alexi Jay’s (2014) independent inquiry 
into child sexual exploitation was significant in making 
explicit links between the organised sexual exploitation 
of children and ‘child trafficking’ in the UK. Jay’s (2014) 
inquiry highlighted how the welfare approach failed to 
protect children who were treated with contempt 
across agencies, by the police, lawyers and social 
workers, in some cases exploitation continuing for many 
years. The Rochdale trafficking cases highlighted 
welfare practitioners inappropriately attributing 
‘consent’ to a ‘lifestyle choice’:  
 
“social work practitioners and managers wholly 
overestimated the extent to which Suzie could legally or 
psychologically consent to the sexual violence being 
perpetrated against her” (Rochdale Borough 
Safeguarding Children’s Board, 2012, p. 19).  
 
In Operation Retriever in Derby, victims of sexual 
exploitation were treated as ‘rebellious adolescents’ 
(Derby Safeguarding Children Board, 2010). Attributing 
consent to young people in exploitative situations is 
problematic in practice in both the welfare and the 
criminal justice approaches within the UK ‘child 
trafficking’ framework.   
 
Children’s own accounts of what is happening to them 
are held in disrepute, there is a ‘culture of disbelief’ cast 
upon children’s migration accounts (Children’s Society, 
2012) with an over-focus by immigration staff in 
assessing the ‘credibility’ and consistency of children’s 
claims (Crawley, 2010b).  The Office of the Children’s 
Commissioner’s enquiry into sexual exploitation by 
gangs If only someone had listened (Berelowitz et al., 
2013) highlights the plight of young people not being 
helped, listened to or taking actions necessary to meet 
their needs. This can result in children experiencing 
trafficking being re-victimised by state policy and state 
actors through punitive treatment or inaction leading to 
further exploitation. In the recent trial of seven 
traffickers in Oxford, one of the several victims giving 
testimony stated, 
 
“Stop blaming the girls, that’s the easy thing to do. It’s 
harder to accept what’s going on and do something 
about it” (Meachin, 2013, p. 31). 
 
Loss 
In the ‘child trafficking’ framework, the process of being 
recognized as a ‘victim’ is central in accessing support 
and assistance. ‘Child trafficking’ campaigning materials 
and the media often draw our attention to the plight of 
‘trafficked children’ as defenceless, innocent, weak and 
biddable, abused by adult authority and force. The child 
protection response to trafficked ‘victims’ recognises 
trafficking as child abuse. Child abuse, however, is often 
presented as a ‘violation of childhood’ or ‘lost childhood’, 
which reinforces an assertion of what childhood should 
be, as a time of innocence, “an asexual and peaceful 
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existence within the protective bosom of the family” 
(Kitzinger, 2004, p.166). The concept of childhood 
innocence in the construction of child abuse can 
stigmatise the ‘knowing child’, as the romanticization of 
childhood “excludes those who do not conform to the 
ideal” (Kitzinger, 2004, p. 168). Both victimhood and 
child abuse narratives draw upon the romanticized 
child concept of innocence coupled with children 
viewed as innately passive, thus requiring adult 
protection.  
 
The child protection response to ‘child trafficking’ can 
be contested as capable of dealing with the complexities 
of separated children’s experiences. The focus on the 
vulnerability and passivity of children within 
protectionist discourses reinforces the perception of 
children’s naivety and dependency (Westwood, 2010). 
Kitzinger (2004) rightly observes a lack of addressing 
resilience and vulnerability, successful coping strategies 
and resistance to abuse. The concept of innocence also 
denies children access to knowledge and power, in turn 
actually increasing their vulnerability to abuse 
(Kitzinger, 2004). Young people can experience 
protectionism within ‘child trafficking’ support services 
as infantilising (Mai, 2011) and socially excluding where 
they are subjected to increased surveillance under the 
guise of protection. The most commonly identified ages 
of children defined as ‘trafficked’ to the UK are 16 and 
17 (Bokhari, 2008) but within the current framework 
these young people are assumed to be “asexual and 
apolitical beings” (Crawley, 2011, p. 1171) with no 
agency. Adolescent separated and moving young people 
therefore, appear to be approached in policy and 
practice through a conceptual understanding of 
childhood that excludes adolescence. 
 
Discussion 
The discourse of risk in ‘child trafficking’ has been 
shaped historically by moral panic as highlighted in the 
19th century purity campaigns in defence of innocence 
and girls’ virginity (Westwood, 2010) and continues 
today, with child protection’s (and social work’s) 
preoccupation with risk, measured against normalised 
standards of behaviour (Parton, 1998). Deviation from 
these norms poses problems for this group of children, 
particularly older children’s agency being 
misrepresented and instead being labelled and blamed 
as ‘deviant’ and ‘immoral’. Separated young people who 
move across physical and social borders can find 
themselves as ‘not fitting’ into social, cultural, legal, 
political, and moral norms and categories within the 
present construction of ‘child trafficking’. As Cohen 
(1972) observes, transcending norms can be viewed as 
a threat to societal values and interests, invoking an 
approach that seeks to increase regulation and control, 
or to punish those that threaten the moral order. ‘Child 
trafficking’ discourses underpinned by concepts of 
passive victimhood, culturally patterned norms of the 
industrialised North, and children perceived as biddable 
and therefore needing to be measured and controlled 
against risks, shape ‘anti-trafficking’ policy and 
influence practice. This constructs a framework that can 
punish or ‘protect’ this group of children, through a 
relationship with state actors typified by 
marginalisation, paternalism, protection(ism) and 
institutionalisation (Qvortup, 1994). 
 
Vulnerable groups emerging as ‘folk devils’ 
threatening societal values are “social types” that serve 
as “visible reminders of what we should not be” (Cohen 
1972, p.10). Hayle (2013) argues that the concept of 
Cohen’s ‘folk devils’ often becomes conflated with 
‘deviants’, ‘risk subjects’ and the socially marginalized. 
Hayle (2013) posits that only a portion of these 
‘deviants’ will go on to being labelled as “evil” (p.1131). 
The predominant criminal justice approach in the UK 
‘child trafficking’ framework can treat children 
punitively through criminalising ‘victims’. Accounts of 
separated and moving children being imprisoned, 
rather than being afforded protection as ‘victims in 
exploitative situations’, were actively debated in the 
House of Lords in 2010 (Butler-Sloss, 2010). Romanian 
children have been convicted and sentenced to prison 
who had been forced by a violent gang into a brothel, 
children caught offending as part of pick-pocketing 
gangs have been prosecuted, Vietnamese children have 
been imprisoned for cannabis cultivation in cannabis 
factories and children detained for holding false identity 
documents, are all examples of ‘victims’ of trafficking 
being criminalised (CEOP, 2009; Butler-Sloss, 2010; 
ATMG, 2010). The criminalization of separated and 
moving children and young people is underpinned by 
objectification of the child’s ‘criminal’ behaviour into 
further re-victimisation by the state. In terms of the 
conceptual rendering of childhood underpinning this 
punitive treatment, one can link it to Puritanical 
perceptions of children as innately evil requiring 
discipline and punishment (James et al., 1998).   
 
‘Popular punitivism’ is viewed by Monterosso (2009) 
as a vehicle that allows the criminalization of the ‘other’, 
scapegoating welfare recipients, immigrants and other 
vulnerable targets (p. 17) and can be related to Cohen’s 
(1972) concept of ‘folk devils’ in moral panic. Popular 
punitivism and the ‘criminalization of social policy’ 
(Rodger, 2008) explicitly link key social policy agendas 
with those of criminal justice, such as family, 
educational, and youth policy (p. 19). This is also 
reflected in ‘child trafficking’, refugee studies (Morrison, 
2001) and in debates about children involved in 
prostitution (Crowley & Patel, 1996): 
 
“The transgression of the idealised construction of 
what adults want to believe is ‘childhood’, has serious 
consequences for young people. Benevolence is 
translated (via the need to ‘protect’ children) into 
punishment” (p. 125). 
 
As Muncie (2009) notes, in criminology and the 
associated linkages to social policy areas, children and 
young people remain an absent ‘victim’ voice. However, 
there is a general paucity of research with separated 
and moving children and young people, and even less 
empirical work addressing children’s agency within this 
group. There remains a distinct gap in understanding or 
representing the subjective experiences of children and 
young people who have experienced trafficking. A more 
nuanced understanding is needed of children and young 
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people who move across not only geographical borders, 
but also who move across adult-defined social borders 
and cross morally defined social norms. What is absent 
is knowledge about the context of children’s social 
movement, changing social roles, and the social mobility 
of children through their lived experiences. 
 
Conclusion 
Blame, disrepute and loss have been considered as 
moral conditions featuring in the construction of the UK 
‘child trafficking’ framework. These conditions have 
been explored as manifestations of morality/immorality 
in the policy and practice framework that serve to 
increase moral regulation and control. Moral panic, 
anxiety and fear can further victimise and criminalise 
marginalised groups, especially those without voice 
who become defined as a threat to societal values, 
leading to reactionary and harmful policy and practice 
responses.  
 
The moral role of social work and research is 
considered to be well placed to challenge the anxiety 
and fear stirred up by moral panics. Social work 
research is underpinned by values towards social justice, 
but is also simultaneously politically engaged and offers 
a means of bringing to light “subjected knowledges” 
(Humphries, 2005, p.284). The subjects of moral panics 
are not named as the claims-makers, the moral 
entrepreneurs or the moral crusaders; their voice is 
largely absent, especially children and young people. 
Since the establishment of the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UN, 1989) listening to the voices of 
children has become a “powerful and pervasive mantra 
for activists and policy makers world-wide” (James, 
2007, cited by Goździak, 2008) however, many social 
science researchers have omitted children as active 
participants informing knowledge and theory. This is 
particularly evident in ‘child trafficking’ research. 
Children’s experiences are notably not represented, an 
issue my PhD research aims to address. My research 
with young people explores their lived experiences as 
children, of separation, of being on the move and ‘child 
trafficking’. Focusing on listening to and hearing how 
children and young people experience their situation, 
young people voice how they have encountered the 
‘child trafficking’ policy and practice framework. Social 
research that accepts children and young people as 
competent social actors in their own right accepts that 
their voices are reflective of their selves. This provides 
not only a space but also a vehicle to represent 
alternative renderings of social issues.  
 
Social work research is well placed to redress moral 
panics through its activity in not only engaging ethically 
with those marginalised with difficult social problems, 
but also to challenge the assumptions underpinning our 
understanding of children, young people, childhood, and 
adolescence. Hasty moral judgements can lead to 
naming and labelling subjects of moral panics all too 
easily as victims/threats or heroes/folk devils. However, 
ethical discernment in social work research allows for 
the discrimination of the conditions of moral panics. 
Within moral panic the dichotomous conditions of 
praise/blame, fame/disrepute, gain/loss can be exposed 
and challenged, offering a more nuanced and balanced 
understanding of social problems. 
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Abstract 
The use of functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(“fMRI”) has expanded rapidly since its inception in 
1990 (Ogawa et al., 1990), making it the cornerstone of 
neuroimaging in cognitive neuroscience (Logothetis, 
2008). fMRI measures haemodynamic change arising 
from enhanced neural activity, particularly suiting it to 
experimental and clinical investigations of brain 
function; indeed, it has become the fundamental 
technique in understanding brain mechanisms, 
providing information on both neuroanatomical and 
functional organisation of the brain. fMRI has been 
pivotal in our understanding of placebo effects. Whilst 
placebo effects are evidenced in an extensive range of 
medical conditions, notably Parkinson’s disease 
(Lidstone et al., 2010) and depression (Kirsch & 
Sapirstein, 1998), the most studied are pain and 
analgesia (Benedetti, 2009). In this article I consider 
fMRI’s contributions to current knowledge of placebo 
analgesia, and discuss the particular strengths and 
constraints of this neuroimaging technique. I conclude 
that fMRI has played an invaluable role in testing and 
improving theories of placebo analgesia (Wager & Atlas, 
2013), and recent innovations such as spinal fMRI 
(Eippert et al., 2009b) and identification of genetic 
biomarkers of placebo responders (Hall & Kaptchuk, 
2013) look set to advance this further. 
 
What is a placebo? 
A placebo is an inactive substance or simulated 
intervention administered for psychophysiological 
benefits, usually under deception; and placebo effects 
are the beneficial effects arising from sham treatments. 
Placebos have been widely used in healing for many 
centuries; indeed, until recently the history of medicine 
has basically been the history of placebo effects 
(Shapiro & Shapiro, 1997). Although initially dismissed 
as experimental or clinical artefacts, placebo effects are 
now recognised as very ‘real’ phenomena (Harrington, 
1999). They are evidenced in animals (Muñana, Zhang, 
& Patterson, 2010), children (Rheims et al., 2008), and 
even without deception (Kaptchuk et al., 2010). 
Placebos come in many forms, including: pills; creams; 
inhalants; injections; procedures such as ultrasound 
(Hashish, Harvey, & Harris, 1985) and surgery (Moseley 
et al., 2002); and the medical practitioner him/herself 
(Kaptchuk, 2002). There is not one single placebo effect, 
but many (Benedetti, 2008). They are highly variable, 
being negligible in some individuals but substantial in 
others (Benedetti, 2009), and although any medical 
intervention is variable since not all patients respond to 
active treatments, placebos are extremely unpredictable. 
Furthermore, they are controversial: when and how to 
use them is an ethical minefield, and some argue that 
certain treatments are entirely placebo, for example 
acupuncture (Leibing et al., 2002) and homeopathy 
(Shang et al., 2005).   
 
Understanding placebo mechanisms is important, not 
only because placebo control groups are integral to 
clinical trials in evidence-based medicine, but because 
placebo effects are an intrinsic part of the treatment 
itself. Indeed, there are two components to any medical 
treatment: the direct pharmacological or physiological 
action of the intervention, and the placebo element. This 
is clearly demonstrated when pain-relief is 
administered covertly: its analgesic effect is less potent 
than when administration is open; e.g. a covert 6-8mg 
morphine intravenous line was as potent for 
postoperative analgesia as an overt 6-8mg saline 
injection (Levine et al., 1981). It is fundamental that 
clinicians and researchers acknowledge the placebo 
component of active medical interventions; efficacy of 
treatments may depend on it. By understanding placebo 
effects we can harness them to maximise health, 
minimize costs and reduce side effects. A further issue 
beyond the scope of this article is that nocebo (adverse 
placebo) effects can also occur (Kong et al., 2008). 
 
Understanding how we perceive pain 
Neuroimaging has significantly advanced our 
understanding of the neural correlates of pain 
perception (Tracey & Mantyh, 2007) and a large, 
distributed brain network that has been implicated in 
pain perception, known as the ‘pain-matrix’ (Iannetti & 
Mouraux, 2010). It is important to note that the term, 
'pain matrix' refers to those brain regions activated 
when pain stimuli have been administered during a 
functional scan; and as such, 'pain matrix' activity does 
not necessarily mean that the person is experiencing 
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pain. Different factors moderate the experience of pain: 
the context of the pain has an impact (pain beliefs, 
expectation and placebo); the individual’s mood is also 
relevant (such as their level of anxiety or depression, or 
tendency to catastrophize); cognitive set moderates 
pain (attention to the pain, distraction, hyper-vigilance 
and catastrophizing); chemical and structure moderates 
pain experience (such as maladaptive plasticity, 
neurodegeneration, and metabolic systems); and the 
injury itself (Tracey & Mantyh, 2007).  
 
The interaction of these factors influences the 
activities of specific regions, and pain emerges from the 
integration and flow of information within these regions. 
Although the areas comprising the pain-matrix are 
therefore equivocally defined (Tracey & Mantyh, 2007), 
there is consensus as to which are central to pain 
experience. A meta-analysis of pain neuroimaging 
studies (Apkarian et al., 2005) clarifies the most 
common pain regions as primary and secondary 
somatosensory cortex, insula, thalamus, anterior 
cingulate cortex (“ACC”), and prefrontal cortices. 
The regions primarily associated with pain processing 
were the focus of two fMRI experiments by Wager et al., 
(2004). They first hypothesised that if placebo reduces 
the experience of pain, then this predicts reduced fMRI 
blood oxygen level dependent (“BOLD”) signal in the 
pain matrix, indicating reduced neural activity in pain 
regions, during pain compared to baseline. This 
prediction was confirmed, the magnitude of signal 
reductions correlating with decreases in pain ratings 
(Wager et al., 2004). The second hypothesis was that 
placebo creates expectations of pain relief, which then 
inhibit activity in pain regions, thereby modulating pain 
matrix activity. Wager et al., (2004) tested this by 
imaging not only the time period of the pain experience, 
but also the time period of the expectation of pain. 
Because the pre-frontal cortex (“PFC”) is associated 
with maintenance of internal representations of 
expectations and goals, and it exerts top-down control 
of other brain areas (Miller & Cohen, 2001), it was 
hypothesised that PFC activation would be stronger 
during the time-period of pain expectation. This 
prediction was confirmed with the finding that stronger 
PFC activation during pain anticipation correlated with 
placebo analgesia ratings and also with reduced 
activation in the pain-matrix (Wager et al., 2004). 
Subsequent fMRI studies have replicated these 
reductions in healthy controls (Eippert et al., 2009a), 
and in clinical samples (Price et al., 2007), thereby 
demonstrating that regions associated with placebo 
analgesia can be generalized beyond the experimental 
scenario (Wager & Atlas, 2013). 
 
Wager et al.’s (2004) study is important in several 
respects. Methodologically, it exemplifies two particular 
strengths of fMRI as an experimental technique. First, it 
enables focus on specific regions of interest, but also has 
the capacity to image activation of entire neural 
networks (Logothetis, 2008). This has particular 
implications for theory, supporting investigations of 
distributed network theories (e.g. Haxby, Hoffman, & 
Gobbini, 2000) and modular theories alike. Secondly, 
fMRI provides a unique window into the dynamics of in 
vivo brain function. This was utilised to great effect by 
Wager et al., (2004), using temporal changes to plot the 
time-course of placebo analgesia in the brain. Indeed, 
these fresh insights enabled the authors to speculate 
that decreases late in the pain response may reflect a 
triggering of opioid mechanisms from prolonged pain, 
or may reflect cognitive reappraisal of pain levels 
(Wager et al., 2004). 
 
From a theoretical perspective, Wager et al.’s (2004) 
study provides converging evidence supporting the 
central role of insula, ACC, and thalamus within the 
pain-matrix. Its findings suggest that placebo 
manipulations reduce neural responses in pain regions, 
thereby refuting a previous suggestion that placebo 
effects are merely reporting bias (Hróbjartsson & 
Gøtzsche, 2001). But perhaps more importantly, it 
provides preliminary evidence (albeit correlational) for 
a mechanism involved in placebo analgesia: the role of 
expectation. 
 
The role of expectation 
As mentioned earlier, there are many placebo effects 
(Benedetti, 2008). Expectancy theory and classical 
conditioning are the main models of placebo effects 
(Stewart-Williams & Podd, 2004); and although 
underlying mechanisms differ, they share a common 
component: expectation (Lidstone & Stoessl, 2007). The 
processes by which expectation is translated into 
biological responses remain uncertain. However one 
proposed mechanism is that expectation induces a 
biochemical response from pre-frontal and limbic 
regions that drives endogenous opioid release (Lidstone 
& Stoessl, 2007). Wager et al.’s (2004) findings are 
consistent with opioid systems being modulated by 
prefrontal, cortically-driven anticipation of analgesia, 
and are substantially supported by subsequent research 
(Lidstone & Stoessl, 2007). For example, an fMRI study 
by Eippert et al., (2009b) found that placebo analgesia 
to heat stimulation was coupled with decreased 
nociceptive processing in the spinal cord, thought likely 
to be mediated by the descending pain processing 
system via a gate control system. The reduced BOLD 
responses observed are thought likely to be caused by 
endogenous opioids (Eippert et al., 2009b), since opioid 
antagonists block placebo analgesia (Benedetti et al., 
2005). Eippert et al., (2009b) demonstrates spinal cord 
fMRI, a relatively new technique that has only recently 
become technically feasible (Meissner et al., 2011). 
Spinal fMRI poses unique challenges: small cross-
sectional dimensions; motion of blood, cerebrospinal 
fluid, adjacent organs and the spinal cord itself; and 
bone and cartilage causing magnetic field 
inhomogeneity (Stroman, 2005). But importantly, this 
technique enables researchers to investigate early 
stages of pain processing. 
 
Using fMRI in combination with other 
techniques 
A favoured technique for monitoring neurotransmitters 
in vivo has been positron emission tomography (“PET”), 
because of the wide range of tracers it can employ; 
however unlike fMRI, PET is invasive. PET is also more 
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expensive and carries a burden of logistical 
requirements such as on-site synthesis. fMRI has been 
instrumental in substantiating PET findings, 
compensating for its poor temporo-spatial resolution; 
indeed, some studies (e.g. Scott et al., 2007) use both 
techniques in conjunction. The first ever meta-analysis 
of placebo analgesia (Amanzio et al., 2013) combines 
the data of haemodynamic changes from 9 fMRI studies 
and 2 PET studies. This convergence of findings 
identified significant clusters broadly consistent with 
areas involved with pain and analgesia (Amanzio et al., 
2013). Importantly, analysis differentiated activations 
during different stages of placebo analgesia: the 
expectation stage; the noxious stimulation stage; and 
stimulation stage deactivations (Amanzio et al., 2013). 
The cortical networks modulating placebo analgesia 
were found to substantially overlap emotional 
processing networks, suggesting that anxiety reduction 
is a component placebo mechanism arising from a 
functional-anatomical relationship between these 
networks (Amanzio et al., 2013). The finding of 
decreased activation in pain-matrix areas during 
noxious stimulation indicates down-regulation of 
nociceptive networks (Amanzio et al., 2013).  
 
There are issues to be overcome when amalgamating 
results in a meta-analysis. Assumptions must be made 
regarding inevitable heterogeneous methodologies in 
segmentation, motion correction, and registration. 
Moreover, fMRI literature reflects a high degree of 
flexibility in analysis methods and data collection (Carp, 
2012), features that can lead to bias (Ioannidis, 2005). 
To minimize reference-frame and scale bias, Amanzio et 
al., (2013) used the Activation Likelihood Estimation 
(“ALE”) quantitative voxel-based method (Laird et al., 
2005). Furthermore, they addressed inter-subject and 
inter-laboratory variability in fMRI data using an 
algorithm to estimate spatial uncertainty of foci, taking 
sample size differences into account. The number of 
studies used is not high because of the paucity of the 
literature; however, data was sourced from 199 
participants (Amanzio et al., 2013). Of these, the gender 
of 33% was unspecified, potentially confounding in two 
respects: first, evidence suggests qualitative differences 
in pain perception between males and females 
(Henderson, Gandevia, & Macefield, 2008); and secondly, 
there are generic anatomical differences between male 
and female brains (Good et al., 2001). Nevertheless, 
objectively summarising results of small, possibly 
statistically-underpowered studies (Carp, 2012), 
provides a broad perspective of the field, enabling 
contributions from small and/or unpublished studies to 
be more useful, and identifying convergences as well as 
gaps in research. 
 
Substantial evidence supports a primary role for 
expectation-activated endogenous opioids in placebo 
analgesia (Murray & Stoessl, 2013), however placebo 
effects can also be non-opioid. Although very little is 
known about non-opioid neurotransmission (Benedetti, 
2009), a study by Scott et al., (2007) provides insight 
into simultaneous opioid and dopamine activation 
during placebo analgesia, thereby supporting a 
relationship between placebo and reward mechanisms. 
The nucleus accumbens is central to reward-expectation 
encoding (Day, Jones, & Carelli, 2011). In a PET study 
Scott et al., (2007) demonstrated that dopamine 
neurotransmission in the nucleus accumbens increases 
as a function of placebo analgesia effectiveness. They 
report a second experiment that used fMRI to 
investigate this further. This found that participants 
demonstrating the greatest BOLD activations in nucleus 
accumbens during a reward-anticipation task also 
showed higher placebo analgesic responses in 
expectation and pain trials. Furthermore, combining 
data from those participating in both PET and fMRI 
experiments revealed positive correlations between 
dopamine release in nucleus accumbens during 
anticipation of analgesia, and right nucleus accumbens 
BOLD activity during reward anticipation (Scott et al., 
2007). This study provides evidence that mesolimbic 
dopaminergic pathways are involved in placebo 
analgesia (Faria, Fredrikson, & Furmark, 2008), and also 
demonstrates the strategic use of fMRI in conjunction 
with other complementary techniques to provide 
multimodal converging evidence (Logothetis, 2008). 
 
Conclusion 
Psychological theories that are biologically-informed by 
brain evidence are most likely to provide valid, 
generalizable predictions, since they are grounded by 
the constraints that are intrinsic to the appropriate 
physiological systems (Wager & Atlas, 2013). Because of 
this, fMRI has played a pivotal role in developing 
theories of placebo analgesia; and despite the ethical 
issues constraining the use of placebos in clinical 
settings, fMRI has also proved invaluable in patient 
studies of placebo analgesia (Price et al., 2007). It has 
been used with versatility to map pain/analgesia 
processing from cortex to spinal cord (Eippert et al., 
2009b), and successfully used in conjunction with PET 
(Scott et al., 2007), thereby demonstrating its 
importance within a multimodal approach to 
understanding brain function (Logothetis, 2008). fMRI 
is undoubtedly a powerful technique, with the 
advantage of being non-invasive yet able to image 
dynamic brain function in vivo with reasonable 
spatiotemporal resolution (Logothetis, 2008). However, 
it has limitations that must be considered. fMRI is an 
indirect measure of neural activity, and is correlational 
not causal, therefore inferences that activated areas are 
necessary or sufficient in a process cannot be made 
(Poldrack, 2008). This can be somewhat compensated 
by using fMRI as a complementary technique within a 
multimodal approach, such as in Scott et al., (2007), 
discussed earlier. More problematic is the ambiguity of 
the BOLD signal, which is unable to clearly differentiate 
between excitation and inhibition, neuromodulation and 
function-specific processing, and bottom-up and top-
down signalling (Logothetis, 2008). Until scientists can 
unravel this complexity, caution with signal 
interpretation must be exercised. 
 
fMRI has significantly advanced our understanding of 
placebo analgesia, clarifying the involvement of pain-
matrix anatomy, and implicating endogenous opioids as 
a common placebo mechanism. fMRI has informed 
theory in two ways: first, by enabling comparisons 
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between neural activations of placebo versus 
psychopharmacological treatments; and secondly, by 
suggesting new avenues for testing. Many questions 
remain unanswered: whether nocebo uses the same 
mechanisms; the role of gender; how placebo analgesia 
is moderated in the brain by associative learning, by 
hormones such as oxytocin (Kessner et al., 2013) and by 
personality traits; and how the patient-practitioner 
relationship may also play a pivotal role in treatment 
outcomes (Hall & Kaptchuk, 2013). Researchers have 
started to address another challenge, identifying genetic 
biomarkers of those individuals who respond well to 
placebos (Hall & Kaptchuk, 2013). It is hoped that in the 
near future this may enable drugs and trials to be more 
specifically tailored to the particular characteristics of 
the patient. Neuroimaging advances such as human 
spinal cord fMRI (Eippert et al., 2009b), have 
contributed to research and expansion of knowledge. 
This knowledge has the potential to enhance the 
veracity of clinical trials and the efficacy of medical 
interventions (Price, Finniss, & Benedetti, 2008), 
thereby improving the lives of patients. 
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“Geography…so what do you actually study?” 
Co-production of knowledge: a postgraduate 
relfection on teaching and learning in higher 
education 
  Stephanie Denning 
Stephanie Denning is in the first year of her PhD in Human Geography at the University of Bristol.  Her 
research considers faith based social action through the philosophical approaches of non-
representational theory and affective geographies.  This includes Stephanie running a project with a 
Christian ethos that responds to food poverty.  Stephanie can be contacted at 
stephanie.denning@bristol.ac.uk or followed on Twitter at @SJ_Denning. 
Abstract 
"What do you study" is a question which I have been 
frequently asked over the last five years since I began as 
a geography undergraduate at the University of 
Birmingham, and now as a postgraduate at the 
University of Bristol.  In this journal style paper I reflect 
on how my understanding and explanations of 
geography have changed throughout my time in higher 
education as a means to reflect on wider practices of 
teaching and learning of geography in higher education.  
It will be shown that co-production of knowledge in 
learning and teaching in higher education occurs 
through a variety of means; distinctions between human 
and physical geography which relate to the 
understanding of school students, co-production beyond 
formal learning environments, co-production through 
community impacts of research, and the co-production 
of knowledge relating to differing expertise of higher 
education institutions both within the UK and beyond. 
 
Co-production was the theme of the 2014 Royal 
Geographical Society (RGS) Annual Conference.  This 
paper was originally written on this theme for the RGS’s 
Higher Education Research Group reflective essay 
competition, for which the paper was the winning entry.  
I consider the co-production of knowledge to reflect on 
teaching and learning as a geography student in higher 
education.  For reflections over space and time I use a 
journal style paper inspired by the style for a piece of 
undergraduate coursework at the University of 
Birmingham.  The first column gives vignettes of 
experiences of co-production which are analysed in the 
second column.  I will show that I have experienced co-
production of knowledge in relation to secondary school 
geography, beyond formal learning environments 
including community based research, and across UK and 
international higher education institutions. 
 
 
Conversation with elderly congregation 
members at church 
September 2009 
"What are you going to study at university?" 
 
I'm going to do a BSc in geography, but I like physical 
geography the most so that involves learning about the 
processes in which landscapes are made - glaciers, 
rivers, mountains.  I will do some human geography too 
though; the BSc and the BA at Birmingham give the 
same options which is one of the reasons I chose to go 
there1.  I hope I get to go on some good fieldtrips, maybe 
one to Iceland to go on a glacier again, I liked doing that 
on holiday with my parents2. 
 
1. Prior to starting my undergraduate degree I was 
aware that my A-level subjects (geography, history and 
philosophy & ethics) were more suited to human than 
physical geography, but had enjoyed physical geography 
more at school.  As will subsequently be examined this 
later came a full circle in terms of specialising in my 
undergraduate degree. 
 
2. Arguably at a younger age it can be easier to 
experience physical geography than human geography, 
as a glacier or mountain can clearly be seen, whilst the 
A-level topics of urbanisation and development can be 
less tangible for a school student without the full 
appreciation that these do in fact impinge upon 
everyday life.
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Geography ambassadors school visit to year 7 
class3 
November 2011 
“What is geography?” 
 
Today we are going to talk to you about why we love 
geography4.  I study human geography and Faye studies 
physical geography5.  I therefore study people and 
places whilst Faye studies natural landscapes such as 
river courses.   
 
3. The Royal Geographical Society (RGS) Geography 
Ambassador programme is part of the RGS's education 
initiative in which university students and graduates 
meet with secondary school children, for example on 
school visits or study days hosted at the RGS.  The aim is 
show the opportunities and benefits of studying 
geography in higher education and beyond (RGS, 2014). 
 
4. An RGS Geography Ambassador "I love geography" 
talk uses the experiences of geography 
(under)graduates to show a passion and excitement for 
geography in higher education to school students who 
could follow this path themselves.  Participation in this 
scheme is therefore an example of co-production 
between university and secondary school students. 
 
5. A binary is often perceived between human and 
physical geography, and qualitative/quantitative 
methods which is an issue that has been debated for 
several decades (Bryman, 1984; Olsen, 2004).  Whilst it 
can be useful to explain the basics of geography, as in 
this example for 11 year olds who may not have studied 
geography as a separate subject before, such a binary 
can be unhelpful in providing unnecessary barriers in 
what is ultimately within one discipline.  Indeed, in co-
production of geographical knowledge beyond 
academia such as in the school classroom, this binary 
can be a hindrance to understanding the wider uses and 
implications of geography beyond academia.  This 
example therefore shows that within higher education 
and the dissemination of knowledge it can be helpful to 
address the human/physical geography and  
qualitative/quantitative debate on a case-by-case basis 
and accept that different methods can meet different 
aims (Onwugebuzie and Leech, 2005; Punch, 2001). 
 
University of Birmingham dance society ballet 
class 
March 2012 
Member of the class: “I saw some people walking 
around campus blindfolded today… odd!” 
 
Ballet teacher/housemate: “Ah yes that’d be the third 
year geographers. Stephanie was telling me it’s 
something about space6” 
 
6. In my second and third years at the University of 
Birmingham I was introduced to the ideas of 
performativity and non-representational theories, 
which in the third year involved a questioning of the use 
of space.  In one piece of coursework, four interventions 
were carried out to analyse how our own bodies were 
situated in space, which included walking as a pair with 
another member of the group around campus with one 
person at a time blindfolded and the other guiding to 
experience space without one the main senses; sight.  
This not only introduced me to what would become the 
foundations of my PhD but also made a wider impact as 
people reacted to the interventions around campus, 
which as seen in the dance class then produced 
conversations beyond geography about what the 
students were doing.  Learning in higher education 
therefore has the potential to extend beyond formal 
learning hours and "contact time", generating 
conversations in social situations and hence wider co-
productions. 
 
Conversation with elderly congregation 
members at church 
April 2012 
“What have you been doing this term?” 
 
This term has been busy but I’ve really enjoyed it.  I did 
a placement7 at a community hub in inner city 
Birmingham which was very different to where the 
university is in Edgbaston to the south-west of the city 
centre and to my previous life experiences.  I analysed a 
community project which had been running and now 
need to write a report about my findings which they will 
be able to use in their funding applications as well as 
provide an overall review for moving forward in 
projects.  Funding is a real issue for their activities but 
an academic report should help in providing a different 
prospective, so I hope it is useful8.   
I also went on a week fieldtrip to Moscow last 
February which I loved9.  Yes, it was very cold!  When 
temperatures reached 0ºC that was warm.  What did we 
do?  Well lots of different projects but it included 
looking at the role that the Soviet past plays in Moscow 
today, faith landscapes, and the production of space in 
Moscow.  We visited Moscow State University which 
was interesting too, a huge and a very striking 
building!10 
 
7. "Professional placements for geographers" was one 
module option available in my third year at the 
University of Birmingham.  Following an interview 
process individual community based placements were 
allocated with a report to be produced around a 
research question requested by the community 
initiative the student was involved with.  This is 
therefore an example of the range of opportunities 
beyond traditional lecture/seminar formats which are 
possible in higher education. 
 
8. The placement was an example of co-production 
between academia and communities.  Whilst it was 
hoped the report produced would benefit the 
community and help access project funding, equally I 
could not have written the report without interviews 
and participant observation at the community hub, and 
this counted as credits towards my degree and hence 
the achievement of a qualification.  There was therefore 
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not only co-production of knowledge, but ideally also 
co-production of benefits across learning in higher 
education and community development. 
 
9. At the University of Birmingham there is an option 
for a considerable portion of a geography degree to 
specialise in post-Soviet and Russian geography (Moran, 
2009).  I specifically remember seeing this in the 
undergraduate at the age of 17 when deciding which 
university to attend and frowning as I was revising A-
level history on Russia from 1855 to 1956 and thinking I 
would be glad to leave this behind at university.  
However, at that point I also saw my interests in 
physical geography so only gave a cursory glance to the 
human geography modules that would be available.  
Little did I realise that three years later I would draw 
upon my A-level history knowledge with enthusiasm 
and develop a fascination common amongst human 
geography students taking these modules (including the 
fieldtrip to Moscow) to question the co-production of 
knowledge between the Soviet and post-Soviet era.  Co-
production in learning and teaching can therefore be 
seen at a number of levels; there is co-production for 
students building upon their previously acquired 
perceptions and knowledge (which as in this instance 
may be unexpected), and secondly, as shown by Moran 
(2009) and Moran and Round (2010) there is co-
production from the students in developing the modules. 
 
10. There were both similarities and differences to 
learning and teaching immediately evident between 
studying in Birmingham and Moscow from our (albeit 
brief) visit to Moscow State University (MSU).  First, 
obviously there was a language difference with courses 
given in English and Russian respectively.  Secondly, 
there is a comparison of the university buildings 
themselves, as shown in figures 1 and 2.  Whilst the 
University of Birmingham's redbrick buildings are 
impressive the MSU main building is one of Stalin's 
"teeth" and an example of iconic Stalinist architecture at 
an almost incomparable scale - the Aston Webb building 
at Birmingham is several floors tall topped with large 
domes, but in the MSU photograph in figure 1 
approximately each window represents one floor level 
making over 20 levels.  In a question I asked to a Human 
Geography lecturer at MSU around Stalinist architecture 
and memory she replied that buildings such as that of 
MSU did help contribute to a positive memory of Stalin.  
However, once sitting in a lecture theatre and walking 
around the department the appearance and atmosphere 
was familiar with typical benches and desks in the 
lecture theatre, notice boards around the department, 
and a canteen for students to eat in.  In this context the 
fieldtrip to Moscow was therefore an example of 
differences and similarities in the co-production of 
knowledge and learning in higher education in different 
countries.  There is however, also a line of argument 
around learning and production in higher education 
across countries that may be harder to appreciate from 
my own positionality; that those outside of the UK and 
USA studying geography can be marginalised by their 
location and writing in languages other than English, 
particularly when submitting work to be published in 
international journals (Robinson, 2003; Jazeel and 
McFarlane, 2010). 
 
Figure 1: Moscow State University, main buiding 
(Author, February 2012) 
 
Figure 2: University of Birmingham, Aston Webb 
buildings (Author, May 2012) 
 
 
Conversation with relatives 
September 2013 
 
“A masters and PhD? What on?” 
 
No I haven’t been on a fieldtrip to trek on a glacier, but 
yes I’m going to do a masters in human geography and 
then a PhD11.  The PhD is about the geography of 
religion with a specific philosophical approach called 
non-representational theory but that’s hard to explain12.  
I want to use the theory as a means to understand the 
functioning of social action in the Church of England and 
have a direct community impact from my research13. 
 
11. My expectations of my research interests 
therefore changed from when I started my 
undergraduate degree and gradated as I began 
envisaging a physical geography or environmental 
management career but have continued to a masters in 
human geography.  My expectations of human and 
physical geography from school geography were 
therefore challenged through learning in higher 
education which arguably is a statement with the 
greatest implications for school GCSE and A-level 
syllabuses.  Indeed, the difference of knowledge on 
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school syllabuses and topics studied at university is one 
of the difficulties I have faced as an RGS Geography 
Ambassador in explaining to school students how 
human geography at university would not necessarily 
fulfil their preconceptions of the school human 
geography subject.  Whilst teaching non-
representational theories at A-level is unlikely to be 
realistic there could be considerably greater overlap 
between the human geography of schools and higher 
education, therefore presenting an opportunity for 
increased co-production of learning and knowledge.   
 
12. Linking to the previous debate on school students' 
preconceptions of human geography, explaining non-
representational theories beyond academia is difficult, 
partly as it leads people to ideas of psychology or 
sociology as they remember the maps and capital cities 
of their school geography lessons which are far removed 
from much of human geography in higher education 
today.  There are therefore huge opportunities for wider 
public engagement between what is learnt in higher 
education and dissemination to the wider general public 
to both dispel geographical myths and show new 
avenues of enquiry for those who might not have 
considered the geography of their school days relevant 
to their work and lives today. 
 
13. Following from the ideals of the Birmingham 
community hub placement, it is important to me that my 
PhD will have a tangible and real community impact to 
give direct co-production of knowledge between my 
research and the communities and organisations 
involved. 
 
Conversation with undergraduate geography 
friends 
December 2013 
"So how is the masters going - one term in now?" 
 
I am really enjoying it so far!  It's been quite different to 
Birmingham as there is a lot more philosophy and 
politics on my course14, and more seminar learning than 
lectures but that could just be a difference of being a 
postgraduate to undergraduate and having a much 
smaller number of people on the course15. 
 
14. The School of Geographical Sciences at Bristol has 
an established interest and specialism in the 
philosophical dimension of human geography, which as 
with the majority of universities - and rightly so - 
impacts upon the content of both undergraduate and 
postgraduate courses.  Similarly, in the School of 
Geography, Earth and Environmental Sciences at the 
University of Birmingham there is (amongst others) an 
established specialism of Soviet and post-Soviet studies 
(Moran and Round, 2010).  Students are therefore able 
to benefit from a co-production of knowledge as their 
knowledge is increased through learning about their 
lecturers' specialism and knowledge.  The impact of 
geographical canons can therefore to some extent be 
seen here as what it taught be can determined by what 
is considered important which varies temporally and 
spatially (Mayhew, forthcoming).  The co-production of 
knowledge between students and lecturers therefore 
also varies spatially and temporally within higher 
education meaning different opportunities may be 
presented at different higher education institutions. 
 
15. There have therefore been differences between 
undergraduate and postgraduate learning, although 
these equally could be differences between ways of 
learning at different universities or on different courses, 
for example other undergraduates at the University of 
Birmingham had more seminars whilst I personally 
predominantly had lectures which has been a key 
difference to my postgraduate learning at Bristol.  In 
both possibilities this shows the diversity of learning 
and teaching in higher education and the variety of 
means through which co-production of knowledge 
between student and lecturer/teacher can be 
experienced. 
 
Conclusions 
I conclude that co-production of knowledge in the 
experience of geography in higher education is varied 
and wide reaching across both space and time.  Co-
production of knowledge across time has been 
particularly evident as experience contributed to 
development in my understanding of what the discipline 
of geography can entail.  It has also been seen that 
knowledge production occurs beyond formal teaching 
environments through informal conversations, 
experiences on fieldtrips, and community based 
research projects.  The author’s positionality is crucial 
to this conversation, making each individual’s co-
production of knowledge unique. 
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Five more years of this: Introduction to a post 
election symposium 
  Frederick Harry Pitts 
Frederick Harry Pitts is an ESRC-funded PhD researcher in the Department of Social and Policy 
Sciences at the University of Bath, UK. His research explores work and work-time in the cultural and 
creative industries, with a specific focus on the struggle to measure, quantify and value creative labour. 
His approach is informed by a critical engagement with Marxian thought and critical theory, including 
Open Marxism, the German Neue Marx-Lektüre and Italian post-operaismo.
Alongside conventional academic journal articles, Tor 
will also feature written work in a range of other 
formats. These may be less scholarly in style, but no less 
scholarly in content. They may be shorter in length, but 
just as long on ideas. The journal particularly 
encourages current affairs opinion and commentary. 
The traditional gestation period of a thesis or a paper 
prevents timely response to moving issues. But Tor 
represents an excellent opportunity for scholars to 
apply their expertise to contemporary talking points as 
they happen.  
 
For this inaugural edition, the journal invited 
comment-style submissions addressing the most 
significant of recent events: the 2015 General Election. 
The resulting symposium of short reflections ruminates 
on the lay of the land post-election. The contributions 
each address a different aspect of the election and its 
aftermath. Some consider the performance of political 
parties. Others assess specific policy issues. Others still 
consider the global context of the next parliament. What 
unites them is that they prime the reader on what to 
expect in this most unexpected of new parliaments. 
Contributors include academics and graduate students 
from the three institutions of the South West Doctoral 
Training Centre: the University of Exeter, the University 
of Bath, and the University of Bristol. True to the 
interdisciplinary spirit of the DTC, contributors focus on 
areas relevant to their research interests. They bring 
subject-specific expertise to issues often elided or 
overlooked in the churn of the political news cycle. Not 
every aspect is covered. Of many big stories, the rise of 
the SNP and the success of the Conservatives receive no 
specific commentary. But the pieces discuss an array of 
issues, some well-covered since the election, and some 
that need further attention. To the well-covered, they 
add new scholarly perspectives. To the rest, they induct 
the reader into some crucial upcoming policy challenges. 
 
In this introduction, I will give a taster of what is to 
follow. I will draw links between the entries by 
wagering some additional observations and 
speculations about the election and the next five years. I 
will place specific focus on prospects for the UK left, 
where, in my opinion, interesting things could happen 
over the course of the next parliament. To a certain 
extent, my reflections will be limited to England. English 
politics is in flux, in a way that Scotland’s are not, for 
instance. Scotland has made a break with the political 
order. England might yet do the same. The situation, of 
course, is distinct in Wales and Northern Ireland. 
 
We open with three pieces reflecting on the 
performance and present prospects of three UK political 
parties: Labour, UKIP and the Liberal Democrats. In the 
first of these pieces, Lewis Coyne assays Labour’s loss 
and the options available to them as they seek to 
recover. Coyne casts a critical eye over the internal 
debate accompanying the post-Miliband leadership 
election. Party soul-searchers typically bemoan a failure 
to connect with one or another group of voters. For the 
left, the working class, lost to abstention in England and 
the SNP in Scotland. For the right, the middle, lost to the 
Tories in England. But, for Coyne, this conceals the need 
for Labour to recast itself as a movement dependent on 
no single base of support. 
 
Most accounts of Labour’s defeat emphasise voters 
rather than non-voters. One popular narrative is that 
Labour lost middle-class votes by appealing too little to 
‘aspiration’. Another is that votes leaked to the Tories 
because of a perceived lack of economic ‘credibility’. But 
one of the more persuasive arguments concerns those 
who did not vote rather than those who did. This has 
become known as the ‘lazy Labour’ explanation 
(Holehouse 2015). It not only explains Labour’s defeat, 
but the wildly inaccurate polling in the run up to the 
election. Polling overestimated Labour support because 
their historical, latent voter base told pollsters they 
would turn out on the day but ended up staying at home. 
Labour’s failure to connect with these voters lost them 
the election. This, we hear, is Ed Miliband’s preferred 
interpretation of his defeat (Eaton 2015).  
 
This resonates with the analysis given by Jon Trickett 
(2015). Trickett’s data suggests that Labour not only 
retained but improved their middle-class support. It 
was actually among working-class voters that Labour 
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leaked support. This gives the lie to the familiar 
argument that Labour was too left-wing and did not do 
enough to secure the votes of middle-class voters. 
Instead, Trickett’s data suggests, Labour insufficiently 
enthused poorer, working-class voters. They did not do 
enough to differentiate themselves from the other 
parties to represent a viable option for those in lowest 
economic bands. In England, these people did not turn 
out to vote. In Scotland, they turned out to vote for a 
party occupying a position on the populist left: the SNP. 
 
The next contribution communicates the importance 
of looking at non-voters as much as those who did vote. 
Voter turnout features prominently in Aurelien 
Mondon’s analysis of UKIP as an electoral phenomenon. 
Against the fulsome coverage presented in the UK media, 
Mondon paints a bleak picture for UKIP’s figurehead 
Nigel Farage. His party’s performance may seem 
significant percentage-wise. But when considered 
against overall voter turnout, it looks far less impressive. 
As Mondon notes, 33.9 per cent of registered voters 
abstained from voting on the day, not to mention those 
who did not register in the first place. This means that 
UKIP managed to secure fewer than one in ten of the 
available votes. This is despite optimum press coverage. 
Political debate skewed onto Farage’s favoured terrain 
whenever the UKIP leader appeared on television or 
radio. But support for UKIP’s ‘nativist’, ‘neo-racist’ right-
wing populism, Mondon suggests, is strikingly meagre. 
UKIP’s significance instead pertains to the effect 
wielded on political discourse through the media. 
Mondon contends that the party is a ‘decoy’ for 
politicians of other stripes to use as a means to shift 
political debate elsewhere. 
 
Mondon ends by recommending that the bubbling 
debate about the limits of political representation focus 
less on how well UKIP or any other party did or should 
have done. Rather, it should focus more on ‘the vast 
majority of the population who votes or does not vote'. 
Indeed, I would suggest that a focus on the latter could 
also help Labour understand the scale of their loss. It 
owes, perhaps, not to a failure to engage already-
enfranchised middle-class voters. Instead, it may owe to 
an inability to offer a convincing political reflection of 
reality for the disconnected, overworked and 
underemployed. In Scotland, a party managed to do this 
to a much greater extent, annihilating Labour in the 
process. But what happened North of the border does 
not tell the whole story. Labour lost in England, too. 
 
In the third contribution, Rebecca Tidy gives an 
insight into Liberal Democrat election strategy. She 
considers where it erred, and how the party recovers. 
Tidy emphasises the Lib Dems’ previous success 
running candidates with strong records of local 
campaigning. She recommends that selection 
procedures return to sourcing candidates with 
established constituency backgrounds. This, she 
contends, will get the Lib Dems back on track. 
 
But can the Lib Dems recover through a local strategy 
votes lost through national complicity in a coalition 
abhorred by many of their potential supporters? Tidy 
suggests that, by playing to their traditional localised 
strengths, the party can recover. But one feels their best 
bet may be to wait for a future realignment of the 
centre-left in the event of Labour’s implosion. Some, 
such as Jon Cruddas, suggest that Labour may not exist 
within a year, rendered extinct by a Spain-style surge of 
the radical left (Holehouse and Knapton 2015). Others 
contend that Labour has ‘outlived its usefulness’ (Todd 
2015). Belonging to another time, it may be ‘Pasokified’ 
(Doran 2015), just as the social democrats were in 
Greece. Its end may unfold in any number of ways. The 
fragile balance of its internal contradictions may be lost 
if either left or right exert too great a pull after the 
leadership election. If Liz Kendall heads up a Blairite 
resurgence, the unions could finally take their 
substantial heft elsewhere to forge a new political party 
of the left. If, by some miracle, the non-aligned left join 
Labour en masse and vote Jeremy Corbyn in as leader, 
the Progress faction will leave and form a new SDP. One 
could plausibly imagine the Lib Dems assimilating into 
the latter post-Labour rump.  
 
But there may be a role for the Lib Dems in an 
altogether rosier outcome. Pressure group Compass 
propose a ‘progressive’ electoral pact motivated by the 
pursuit of proportional representation (2015). The pact, 
supporters suggest, would witness a cessation of 
hostilities between Labour, the Greens and the Lib Dems 
in England for the next election. It would even extend to 
giving SNP candidates a free run in Scotland, and, 
presumably, Plaid Cymru in Wales. They would 
campaign on a platform of PR, from which all would 
benefit, and upon which Labour may depend for its 
survival (Bastani 2015, Hind 2015).  
 
The trouble with such putative pacts is the pitch. They 
are phrased in terms of ‘progressiveness’. But 
‘progressive’ is a largely meaningless term imported 
from the different political context of the United States. 
For many, progress is less of a selling point than 
standstill. Some want to roll things back, not push them 
forwards. Why propel the world further and faster on its 
present trajectory, when we can stop it and get off? On 
both the left and the right, Green and UKIP, voters are 
circumspect about hurtling forwards into a false 
gleaming future. For the first, environmental collapse 
awaits. For the latter, untrammelled immigration and 
the European super-state. Any ‘progressive’ political 
pact must contend with these conservative realities. 
And this is not only about the right. A left 
conservativism is something considered, albeit in a 
foreshortened way, by the ‘Blue Labour’ faction of 
Cruddas, Maurice Glasman et al (Mardell 2015). The left 
will spend a lot of time defending things under attack 
from the forces of capital in the next five years. Further 
‘progress’ along the lines implied in the epithet 
‘progressive’ will be the last thing on their minds. We 
have lived with capitalist ‘progress’ for some time now, 
sadly. And some, unsurprisingly, want to escape. 
 
The aforementioned eventualities may sound 
unlikely- splits, new parties, pacts. But the only thing 
predictable about the next five years is their 
unpredictability. The EU referendum and the attendant 
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prospect of second Scottish Indyref in the event of 
Brexit add a layer of overarching political uncertainty. 
Cameron faces trouble keeping unruly ministers loyal to 
whichever party line the PM takes on Europe (Watt and 
Wintour 2015). Complicating matters further, Cameron 
plans to step down ahead of the next election.  But more 
unpredictable still is how people react to another five 
years of cuts to welfare, reforms to employee 
protections and attacks on working conditions. There 
are plenty of big stories to come in the formal sphere of 
parliamentary politics. But the politics of the street, the 
staffroom and the picket line promise to be as 
significant. The Tory party and its traditional class 
constituency are emboldened by the promise of 
shredded red tape and restrictions on union freedoms. 
On the other side, the first two weeks of the new 
government provoked renewed street protests. These 
will only intensify as the new government picks fights 
over where the axe falls next. Resistance may coalesce 
around an identifiable electoral project. This would be 
in line with the ‘electoral turn’ witnessed elsewhere on 
the European left (Milburn 2015). The decision of some 
on the radical left to throw their lot in with the Green 
Party (Ollie V, 2015) could be a harbinger of things to 
come. 
 
Could Labour’s rightward shift catalyse a divorce 
within its ranks (Chessum 2015)? Might we see a new 
party funded by trade unions and composed initially of 
what is now the parliamentary Labour left? The 
numbers of the latter swelled with the 2015 intake, 
which is far more leftish than the last. Moreover, the flux 
in which Labour finds itself makes such possibilities 
perfectly discernible.  
 
Scotland has a successful and populist left electoral 
force, in the shape of the SNP. It also has a grassroots 
social movement sprung from the energy of the Radical 
Independence Campaign. In the absence of any formal 
electoral movement of the left in England, the next five 
years may witness the building of grassroots 
alternatives. These may politicise social relations 
(Bonefeld 2014) rather than enter politics directly. They 
could circulate around food, housing, culture and 
relationships, and find ways to meet the need for them 
outside capitalist social forms. The rise of Syriza in 
Greece relied in part on the development of an 
alternative solidarity economy of foodbanks, for 
instance (Mason 2015a). Extended to our different, less 
desperate context, such innovations would not only 
respond to poverty and the retreat of the welfare state. 
They would also support new ways of living and relating 
to each other. Instead of addressing themselves to the 
seizure of state power, they would build an existence 
outside the nexus of commodities, money and labour. 
The next parliament will push a renewed programme of 
austerity and cuts. Those subject are presently deprived, 
in England at least, of an authentic party-political 
representation of the desire for any alternative to the 
present state of things. It will be interesting to see 
whether prefigurative projects will spring up over the 
next few years that address both the material and 
political impasse. 
 
Government support is receding ever further. Projects 
like, say, ‘communist foodbanks’, may step in. They 
would turn, in an unsanctioned way, the government's 
own abandoned big society against them.  The next 
contribution to the symposium concerns the role of 
foodbanks in the ‘new welfare settlement’ of Tory rule. 
In it, Rana Jawad suggests that cuts in welfare 
provision demand new approaches to poverty 
alleviation. The work of faith and charitable groups in 
setting up and running foodbanks has provided a much-
needed source of support to those left behind by a 
lopsided labour market. Foodbanks may be auspiciously 
an ‘emergency measure’ forged in the aftermath of the 
economic crisis. But Jawad suggests that they are ‘the 
best kept secret of British Social Policy’.  
 
Jawad suggests that, in the UK, as many as one million 
people use foodbanks. Thus far, foodbanks have taken a 
strictly faith-based or charitable complexion in the UK. 
But, reading Jawad’s piece prompts thoughts of new 
agendas. What further developments in this area might 
accompany the continued retrenchment of the welfare 
state under the new government? Could resistance to 
austerity come to resemble to same politicisation of 
everyday life attempted by Syriza in the far more acute 
Greek scenario? Bristol, home of the SWDTC, possesses 
many examples of an alternative economic 
infrastructure: food co-ops, a local currency, freeshops 
and shareshops, community supported agriculture and 
cafes serving free meals sourced from supermarket food 
waste. What new dimensions might all this assume in 
the next five years? Bristol witnessed a huge Green 
surge at the election. In Bristol one sees a possible basis 
for a politics unrestricted by the formal political realm 
of rhetoric, electioneering and policymaking. Rather, its 
purchase is on the ground. The strength of the Green 
Party suggests that Bristol’s projects and movements 
may have found at least some existing electoral 
expression. Indeed, in London, Sian Berry, a Green 
candidate for the mayoral nomination, has promised 
‘bring the energy’ of campaigns and movements ‘into 
City Hall’ (2015). Her role would be to channel in the 
formal political sphere the extra-parliamentary 
demands of movements embedded in everyday life. This 
indicates a potential combination of street politics, 
practical alternatives of cooperation and mutual aid, 
and a left 'electoral turn'. This potent mix will be worth 
a keenly kept eye in years to come.  
 
The Green election campaign, exemplified in Bristol, 
held sway best as an expression of local sentiment 
rather than as a national programme for change. This 
perhaps owes to the poor performance of the party’s 
leader, Natalie Bennett, on the national stage. The 
Greens performed well in Bristol, and achieved their 
best result in a UK election. But, nationally, the party 
acted as a vector of concerns quite apart from its 
founding purpose. Instead of the environment, the 
terrain upon which it fought concerned economic 
injustice and immigration. Indeed, the environment 
hardly featured in the electoral campaigns of any major 
party, the Greens included. The short-termist outlook of 
UK politics suggests that the environment will continue 
to be one of several elephants in the room.  
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Post-election, Cameron assigned the environment 
brief to a rare Tory climate change ‘believer’, Amber 
Rudd (see Carrington 2015). Meanwhile, he is beholden 
by virtue of his small majority to the sceptical right of 
his party. This suggests that green issues are by no 
means beyond political contention in this parliament. In 
the next contribution, Nick Kirsop-Taylor surveys the 
future of biodiversity offsetting. It illustrates how 
Cameron’s pledge to be the ‘greenest government ever’ 
has collided with the reality of cuts to the Defra budget. 
Biodiversity offsetting is a mechanism whereby the 
environmental costs of building and development are 
repaid through new green initiatives elsewhere. 
Theoretically, when one tree falls, another is planted 
somewhere else. But, Kirsop-Taylor suggests, this policy 
is unlikely to survive the next parliament other than as a 
seldom-seen clause buried in planning rules. 
 
Whatever comes of it, biodiversity offsetting is 
revealing of at least one government foible of both the 
last five years and the next. To tally up the cost of what 
is lost and how much is needed to replace it, the natural 
world must be measured and given a value. What should 
rightly escape the sphere of economic calculation is 
made subservient to it. As a 2014 Financial Times article 
on the topic attests (Wilson 2014), it is not always easy 
to establish a clear measure of value for flora and fauna, 
birds and bees. With difficulty, the violence of 
quantitative abstraction is wrought upon the wilderness. 
It acquires a monetary value, and becomes 
commensurate with other things in the world of 
commodities. It can then be traded, bought and sold. It is 
no accident that these policy proposals have coincided 
with recent, unsuccessful attempts to sell off Britain’s 
forests (BBC 2013). 
 
This same process occurs elsewhere in Tory reforms 
commenced in 2010. This is especially the case where 
they pertain to that which was formerly public shifting 
into private hands. Nowhere more so is this dialectic of 
measurement, privatisation and commodification in 
evidence than in education. In the next contribution, 
Anna Edwards assesses the ongoing ‘quasi-
marketisation’ of secondary education. The transferring 
of public assets into private hands via academisation 
depends upon systems of measurement. They are akin 
to that practiced in the process of biodiversity offsetting. 
As Edwards notes, ‘a market-based approach to the 
delivery of education […] rests upon the assumption 
that we can accurately measure and compare school 
performance and educational standards'. Edwards 
suggests neither the Conservatives or Labour question 
the ‘philosophical’ viability of this measurement. It falls, 
then, to others to question the measures and valuations 
made.  
 
On the one hand, the main political parties appeal to 
the good of the economy as an abstract, external force 
for which we are compelled to do our best. But, on the 
other hand, evidence of contestation is everywhere, 
when one looks for it. ‘Value struggles’ (Frenzel and 
Beverungen 2014) contest governmental or capitalist 
understandings of what something is ‘worth’. They are 
surprisingly commonplace in the UK, despite being 
rarely thought of as such. These struggles typically 
concern a few recurring themes. A resource facing cuts 
or privatization. The imposition of something lucrative 
to its owners but of little use to anyone else. The 
eradication or exploitation of heritage or green space. 
Many examples spring to mind. Grassroots campaigns to 
save local NHS services. Anti-fracking movements. Local 
groups fighting chain stores, supermarkets and big-
name coffee shops dominating their high streets. These 
all pitch different visions of worth that undermine blind 
subservience to the ‘economy’. They challenge the 
narrow quantitative understanding of value that the 
'economy' implies. As the new Tory majority pursues an 
agenda of privatisation and marketization, expect these 
value struggles to intensify. Higher education may be a 
flashpoint, with staff and students foremost in fighting 
these struggles (Morgan 2015). There are few sectors 
with as much at stake from measurement, monitoring, 
commercialisation and privatisation. 
 
In the next contribution, Donna Clutterbuck 
discusses the new government's approach to domestic 
violence. Clutterbuck highlights the contradictions of 
Tory policy. These contradictions are between not only 
words and actions, but within individual pieces of 
legislation. For instance, domestic violence legislation 
now males provision for instances of coercive control. 
But this legislation does not specifically address gender. 
This absence is stark in light of statistical evidence 
showing that women are overwhelmingly more likely to 
be victims of domestic violence of all kinds. Further, 
funding cuts have severely inhibited the ability of 
support services to cope with demand. What is more, 
cuts to legal aid prevent women subject to domestic 
violence from seeking and gaining justice. Promised cuts 
to public spending, Clutterbuck writes, will further 
undermine Cameron's professed commitment to tackle 
violence against women.  
 
The final two contributions turn to events outside the 
UK. In the penultimate piece, Bruce Morley highlights 
how the fortunes of the UK economy may have less to do 
with government policy than with the health and 
survival of the Euro. Morley begins by giving an 
overview of the history and present predicament of the 
Eurozone. He suggests that the UK could benefit from a 
fall in the strength of the pound ‘in sympathy with the 
Euro’. This would increase exports and thus GDP. But, 
should the serious problems faced by the Euro explore, 
the UK will be badly burnt.  
 
In that event, it will be interesting to see to whom 
Cameron and Osborne apportion blame for any decline 
in the British economy. They were elected in 2010 by 
holding Labour personally culpable for a global 
economic crash. They were re-elected in 2015 by 
claiming personal responsibility for the recovery. So far, 
so consistent. But if they endure either European or 
global instability at some time in the next parliament, 
personal responsibility will be a hot potato they will be 
loath to keep hold of. On one side of the green benches 
at least, the explanatory burden is sure to fall anywhere 
but upon the budgetary red box. 
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In the final contribution to the symposium, Biao 
Zhang considers the future prospects for the UK’s 
relationship with China. Zhang describes how, in the last 
parliament, Cameron moved the UK much closer to 
China. Interestingly, Zhang situates this move in the 
context of Britain’s ‘special relationship’ with the United 
States. The UK is a minor partner in relations with both 
the US and China, and will, Zhang suggests, choose 
between the two big powers in shifting ways that 
address specific needs: economic, political, military. One 
gets the impression of the UK as a silent, supine second-
rater desperate to court others but always waiting on a 
call.  
 
This brings to light a feature of this election and likely 
many more hence. The two main parties do not wish to 
discuss the big challenges and issues of the next decades 
(see Mason 2015b for an example). One is the growing 
irrelevance of the UK as a global player, forced to 
negotiate in the gaps between the tectonic plates of 
world power in East and West. A second relates also to 
the rise of China as an economic powerhouse, and it is 
with this aspect that I will end. The world of 
employment has changed in the UK. As manufacturing 
has gone East, so have the jobs associated with it and 
the lifestyles they implied. In a flexibilised low-skill 
service economy, unemployment and underemployment 
are permanent. They are unsolvable short of a 
restructuring and redistribution of working hours- a 
prospect far-fetched in the present system. Automation 
is a major possibility given nary a mention by any 
leading politician. It promises to make redundant the 
remaining few in possession of a full-time secure job 
(Frey and Osborne 2013, Lanchester 2015). In a society 
ill-prepared to countenance, let alone support, life 
without work, this represents an impending social 
disaster. Politicians compete with one another to 
penalise those who do not work or cannot find one of 
the few jobs available to the many forced to need them. 
Life is made intolerable without employment in a 
society that does not afford employment for all in the 
first place. More welfare cuts are to come. The 
imposition of workfare continues. Thus, the material 
conditions to be safe, secure, happy and fed will depend 
upon one’s capacity to work for the foreseeable future. 
But the basis for this is rapidly eroding, and no 
politician will publicly note it. Sold on the lie that the 
system is here to stay, those subject to a society of work 
on the wane will only suffer. The next five years may not 
witness any confession or acknowledgement of it. But a 
social crisis is unfolding that will define the 
development of new political projects over the course of 
the next parliament. We have five years more of this- of 
further austerity, cuts to welfare and worsening 
precariousness. The party that best plugs into this 
prospectus stands to profit. Whether that party 
currently exists remains to be seen. An English Podemos 
may yet appear. Five more years may be a long time 
indeed. 
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Labour’s defeat on the 7th of May was remarkable in its 
scale and speed. The widespread incredulity which 
greeted the 10pm exit poll swiftly gave way to 
resignation as it transpired that not only had Labour 
been all but wiped out – as expected – by the SNP in 
Scotland, but they had made almost no headway against 
the Conservatives in England and Wales. Although in the 
history of the party there have technically been greater 
defeats (in 1931 and 1983), Labour has arguably never 
been in a more perilous situation. Worse, few Labour 
politicians or sympathetic commentators appear to 
recognise this, and consequently their strategic 
prescriptions merely risk compounding the problem.  
Essential to Labour’s defeat is the opinion polling 
debacle. In 2012 Labour appeared to open a sizable lead 
in the polls. This was attributed to three factors: the 
conversion of 2010 Liberal Democrat voters to Labour, 
the rise of UKIP initially at the expense of the 
Conservatives, and the standard ‘swing voters’ moving 
between the Tories and Labour. This formed the basis of 
a strategy to secure a mere 35% of the vote, proven to 
be sufficient for a majority government by the 2005 
victory. Labour’s lead gradually fell over the course of 
three years to an election-day tie with the Conservatives 
at 34%, apparently leaving Labour with every chance of 
forming the next government. The flaw in the plan, 
however, was that the polls were systematically 
overstating Labour support, and thus the strategy was 
built on sand. 
 
The cause of this consistent inaccuracy is currently the 
subject of an enquiry by the British Polling Council, but 
post-election research provides sufficient evidence for 
an analysis of the final result. According to some, the 
reason Labour lost is that they were too left-wing: as a 
result of their narrow strategy, Labour failed to occupy 
the political centre ground and speak to the aspirations 
of middle England. Within the party, Tony Blair and 
Peter Mandelson, amongst others, point to Labour’s loss 
of key marginal seats in England as proof that the 
country defaulted to the Conservatives for the above 
reasons.  
 
Others, such as Owen Jones and Len McCluskey, have 
noted in response note that Labour’s wholesale collapse 
in Scotland to a party that positioned itself to Labour’s 
left is at odds with the Blair-Mandelson analysis. It is 
argued that in the eyes of the Scottish electorate Labour 
was too right-wing, and this was the decisive factor. All 
agree, however, that instrumental in Labour’s defeat 
was the public perception of economic incompetence, a 
result of the leadership’s failure to rebut the colossal 
falsehood that the 2007 global financial crisis was 
caused by Gordon Brown spending money on schools 
and hospitals.  
 
Both assessments are partially correct insofar as they 
identify an aspect of the defeat. However, both miss the 
fact that Labour’s loss was actually three-fold. Firstly, 
Labour lost left-wing voters and all but one seat in 
Scotland to the SNP. Secondly, Labour lost moderate 
voters in England and Wales to the Conservatives, losing 
the marginal seats. And finally, Labour lost working-
class voters to UKIP across the country, but particularly 
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in Labour’s so-called heartlands (although UKIP have so 
far failed to gain any seats from this). 
 
Tristram Hunt, MP for Stoke-on-Trent and one-time 
television historian, has correctly identified the above – 
dubbing it Labour’s “triple-bind” – and recognised that 
Labour cannot win an election without winning over all 
three voting blocs. He is wrong, however, to suggest that 
a return to New Labour will recapture the lost voters. 
On the contrary, New Labour’s record in government is 
precisely why left-wing voters have abandoned the 
party, and the cultural alienation of the general public 
from the metropolitan-elite leadership is a key factor in 
working-class voters moving to UKIP. Never mind that 
UKIP is a quintessentially establishment party – they 
have successfully portrayed themselves as outsiders 
and the defenders of those left behind. 
 
This is the true picture of Labour’s defeat, and the 
electoral Everest they have to climb in order to win 
again: they have to be left-wing enough to appeal to 
those who have switched to the SNP and the Greens, 
without scaring off middle-England swing voters who 
backed the Tories. But it is winning back the third 
voting bloc, working-class UKIP supporters and non-
voters, which represents the greatest challenge to the 
party. Labour was founded in order to represent 
working-class people: if they are usurped in that 
function – even ‘illegitimately’ by a right-wing party – 
then the crisis Labour faces is truly existential, of a scale 
never before seen in the party’s history. So how is it to 
be done?  
 
The only way Labour can hope to reunite these three 
blocs of voters is to renounce its status as a calculating 
electoral machine, and genuinely rebuild as a movement 
representative of the cultures and regions of the UK. 
They have to find purpose in a thousand local 
campaigns to win back the trust lost so thoroughly in 
the New Labour years. They have to think big and, for 
the first time since the 1970s, offer a grand vision 
capable of unifying apparently disparate groups, 
underpinned by the belief that nobody, anywhere, can 
be written off as the collateral damage of globalisation. 
Whether political obsessives called this socialism or 
social democracy, Red Labour or Blue Labour, would 
matter less than the fact that it involved those who do 
not think in such terms. 
 
Jon Cruddas, the party’s resident intellectual, is one of 
the few in the Labour high command to really 
understand the extent to which they have to change in 
order to survive. Tom Watson, running for the deputy 
leadership, is another. But on the evidence thus far, the 
frontrunners for the leadership – Andy Burnham, Yvette 
Cooper, and Liz Kendall – largely represent a step back 
to the obsolete Blair-Brown years. Imagining a grander 
form of Labour politics might be easier said than done – 
but if in 2020 the new leader attempts one more heave 
of the New Labour strategy, the 2015 result will pale in 
comparison. 
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UKIP received significant media attention, both as a 
contender and as an issue, in the 2014 EU elections and 
2015 General election. While the party caused an 
‘earthquake’ a year ago when it won the European 
contest, its results in the General election have proven 
harder to gauge either positively or negatively. UKIP 
only managed to send one candidate to Westminster 
(Douglas Carswell, a defector from the Conservative 
party), not only losing the second seat it had acquired 
after another Tory defection, but also with Nigel Farage 
himself failing to win South Thanet. On paper, it seems 
that the ‘purple revolution’ has petered out. However, it 
would be a mistake to reduce UKIP’s electoral 
performance to the number of seats it will occupy in 
parliament. On the whole, the party performed well 
when considering it polled second in 125 seats across 
England and Wales (Steafel et al. 11 May 2015). 
Contradictory accounts of UKIP’s performance are 
further nuanced when abstention is taken into account. 
With 33.9% abstention, UKIP’s overall share of the 
registered vote falls to 8.3% – a figure which is even 
lower when non-registered voters are taken into 
account. This suggests therefore that while the 
performance of UKIP should not be downplayed, it is not 
the alternative it has been painted to be in much of the 
media, as the party has failed to appeal to more than one 
out of ten British voters despite very favourable 
circumstances (Mondon 2015). 
 
From a single party issue to the radical right 
Yet it is clear that the former single-issue party has 
become an important player in British parliamentary 
politics, if not for its presence in Westminster, then in 
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the media. It is argued here that part of its success has 
come from its transition from a narrow Eurosceptic 
platform to a radical right strategy. While this move has 
certainly limited the appeal of the party to certain parts 
of the electorate, it has strengthened its status as an 
outsider and an alternative, through its constant and 
disproportionate mediatisation.  
 
Defining the radical right is a task in itself, and one 
which cannot be done justice in this short article. For 
clarity and brevity, I will focus on the three aspects I 
believe to be core to contemporary radical right parties: 
nativism, neo-racism and right-wing populism. 
However, many examples suggest that UKIP has moved 
towards other traditional core concepts of the radical 
right such as a strong symbolic leadership and 
authoritarianism (Mudde 2007; Mondon 2013). 
Nativism and neo-racism 
Nativism can be described as ‘the desire to return to, or 
restore, indigenous practices, beliefs, and cultural forms 
inhibited, destroyed, or outlawed by a colonizing power’ 
(Buchanan 2010). As Nicholas Startin (2015: 313) has 
noted, ‘the British Eurosceptic tradition is very much 
linked to the past and to a nostalgic attachment to a 
perceived, bygone era of a better Britain […] deeply 
couched in notions of sovereignty and identity’. 
However, Farage’s UKIP has pushed this nationalist 
feeling based on a seemingly glorious past and 
independence to another level, adding the fear of an 
‘Other’ in the form of Brussels as the elitist enemy 
and/or the immigrant as the coloniser. While its 2015 
manifesto clearly shies away from traditional radical 
right discourse, the party’s media strategy during the 
2014 and 2015 campaigns made it clear that UKIP’s 
issue with immigration is not just ‘about space’  (UKIP 
2015: 11). In fact, numerous incidents during 2014 and 
2015 have highlighted that UKIP’s discourse often 
verges on neo-racism, and at times even traditional 
racism. Farage himself has often been on the frontline, 
rendering UKIP’s assertions about rogue candidates 
unconvincing. During UKIP’s 2014 spring conference, 
Farage (in Sparrow 28 February 2014) declared that ‘in 
scores of our cities and market towns, this country in a 
short space of time has frankly become unrecognisable’ 
and that ‘this is not the kind of community we want to 
leave to our children and grandchildren’, demonstrating 
clearly the threat posed by an outsider to a reified 
national identity. Four days before the European 
elections, having already declared on LBC (LBC 16 May 
2014) that he would be ‘concerned’ were a ‘group of 
Romanian men’ to move next door, Farage stressed 
further that ‘any normal and fair-minded person would 
have a perfect right to be concerned’ in such 
circumstances (UKIP 18 May 2014). This 
essentialisation of a whole population on the basis of 
nationality or culture was a clear utterance of neo-
racism:  
 
a racism which has as its dominant theme not 
biological heredity, but the irreducibility of cultural 
differences; a racism which, at first sight, does not imply 
the superiority of certain groups or peoples over others, 
but “only” the noxiousness of the removal of borders, 
the incompatibility of ways of life and traditions  
(Balibar 1997: 33) 
 
This added to a series of other ‘gaffes’ culminating in 
the racist outbursts of Godfrey Bloom (Mason 7 August 
2013), Kerry Smith (Mason 14 December 2014) and 
Rozanne Duncan (Hull 2015) amongst others, as well as 
the departure of prominent supporters over UKIP’s 
lurch to the extreme right (Thandi 13 May 2014), 
something which Alan Sked (Sked 26 May 2014) also 
deplored after he left the party he founded in 1993. 
Borrowing further from other European radical right 
parties, UKIP has also surfed the wave of Islamophobia, 
most notably when Farage attempted to capitalise on 
the tragic Charlie Hebdo events in France, declaring that 
‘we have got no-go zones across most of the big French 
cities’ – the ‘we’ being of particular note here. 
A populist party 
Whatever your definition of the concept, whether it is 
seen as a style, a discourse or a thin ideology, UKIP’s 
recent campaigns are clearly populist. In Nigel Farage’s 
pledge on the front page of the party’s 2015 manifesto 
(UKIP 2015: 1), the phrase ‘real people’ is emphasised 
in the largest font. These idealised ‘real people’ are 
associated with the concepts of ‘integrity’ and ’honesty’, 
standing in clear opposition to ‘a career political class’ 
and to immigration – the first of the ‘major issues of the 
day’ (UKIP 2015: 3). Under Farage’s leadership in 
particular, UKIP has taken advantage of the distrust 
most people have in political parties and the workings 
of democracy, in the UK as well as Europe. Since 2010, 
respondents declaring that they ‘tend not to trust 
political parties’ have averaged 82%, compared to an 
average of 13.6% for those who ‘tend to trust’ them 
(European Commission 2015). In a 2012 
YouGov/University of Oxford survey, Peter Kellner 
(2012), highlighted that while around two thirds of 
respondents in the England, Wales and Scotland 
‘described Britain as a democratic country’ and believed 
that ‘Britain’s system is one of the best in the world’, 
less than 15% felt that the Westminster parliament does 
a good job ‘representing the interests and wishes of 
people like you’. Such distrust and disenchantment in 
the workings of democracy, coupled with the economic 
uncertainty which came as a result of the Global 
Financial Crisis, have made contemporary British 
politics fertile soil for a populist party like UKIP 
UKIP: disease or symptom 
Therefore, that UKIP, a now typical radical right party, 
appeals to the disenchanted and disaffected should not 
come as a surprise, nor should its relative success 
within part of the working class. Contrary to some 
common narratives in the UK, such trends are not new. 
Part of the voting working class has always been 
attracted to the radical right, and at best, only two thirds 
of it ever voted for the left, leaving at least a third for the 
right (Ipsos Mori 2010). Yet the hype around UKIP as an 
alternative to mainstream parties is dangerously 
misleading (Mondon 2015). It presupposes that UKIP is 
a convincing alternative, while, in fact, as with many of 
its radical right counterparts in Europe, it has so far 
failed to break through its glass ceiling despite very 
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favourable conditions and disproportionate 
mediatisation key to political success today. While the 
UK electorate is not immune to the Europe-wide 
disenchantment with politics, ‘only’ 8.3% of registered 
voters turned to UKIP in the General election. While the 
electoral system may have played a part in forcing some 
potential UKIP supporters towards parties more likely 
to have an impact in Westminster, Farage has failed to 
bring voters out of abstention in droves, demonstrating 
that UKIP is not the alternative they are waiting for. 
Furthermore, abstention is largest within the loosely-
defined working class (Ipsos Mori 2015)2.  This is UKIP’s 
so-called target electorate. But the figures (57% turnout 
for categories D and E and 62% for C2, compared to 
66% overall) show a similar trend to that in EU 
elections (European Parliament November 2012). While 
UKIP is doing well amongst the working class (18%), its 
share of the vote in this category when taking 
abstention into account is in fact just over 10%, 
meaning that 9 out of 10 members of the working class 
do not find UKIP an appealing alternative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Therefore, while the rise of UKIP is concerning, it is 
only a small part of the picture. If we are to take the 
issue of democracy seriously, UKIP should only occupy a 
marginal part in the debate about politics and the ways 
to reform our current democratic system, if indeed it 
can be reformed. Instead, closer attention should be 
paid to the vast majority of the electorate which votes or 
does not vote, but on the whole agree about their 
distrust in parties and politics in the narrow sense of the 
term. However, at present, UKIP, and the radical right in 
general, have been convenient decoys which have 
allowed politicians, commentators and academics alike 
to stray away from more ambitious questions about the 
very nature of democracy in twenty-first century 
Europe. 
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The Liberal Democrats received their highest ever share 
of the vote in the 2010 General Election.  Former party 
leader, Charles Kennedy, had been successful in 
ensuring that the party adopted a long-term strategy 
that involved increasing vote share, instead of focussing 
only upon a limited number of target seats.  The party 
received 23% of the national vote and returned 57 MPs 
to the House of Commons. Therefore, neither the Liberal 
Democrats nor the pollsters themselves anticipated that 
the party would receive its lowest share of the vote 
since its formation in 1988 during the 2015 General 
Election.  Nationally, the party won just 7.8% of the vote 
and held only 8 seats. 
 
It is barely a month after the election and party 
officials are still trying to work out what went wrong.  
Despite this, the party is keen to regain the ground that 
has been lost over the last 5 years and has already 
invited supporters to join the ‘Liberal Democrat Fight 
Back.’  This article assesses how the results of the 2015 
General Election may impact upon the party’s campaign 
strategy and discusses ways in which they should ‘fight 
back’. 
 
Local level campaigning 
During the 1990s, the party used a combination of local 
level campaigning and community politics within their 
electoral strategy.  This involved distributing locally 
focused literature, canvassing and engaging with 
residents to develop local policies addressing their 
concerns. They tried to select candidates with a long-
term commitment to both local campaigning and 
standing for election, so that they could reduce the 
impact of having limited resources.  Studies have shown 
that the party performed better in wards with 
candidates that met these criteria (see for instance, 
Cutts, 2004; Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005; Denver et al., 
2003).   
 
Given that the party still has fewer resources than its 
Conservative and Labour counterparts, selection 
committees should, once again, seek candidates willing 
to commit a substantial period of time to local 
campaigning and standing for election over a period of 
years.  Selection committees should address these 
questions prior to choosing candidates. Many people, 
including David Steele, have anticipated that the cause 
of liberalism has been set back several decades. A 
selection process based on local campaigning may help 
overcome this setback. 
 
Running a continuous local campaign is labour 
intensive, but it has been shown that the more intense a 
party’s local campaign, relative to its opponents’, the 
better its performance (Cutts, 2006).  Local campaigning 
is also a larger predictor of electoral success within the 
Liberal Democrats, than within the Conservative or 
Labour parties.  Therefore, it is important that the party 
can mobilise volunteers to run these campaigns.  Over 
three quarters of constituency campaigns benefit from 
volunteers that are not members (Fisher et al. 2013), so 
existing volunteers and candidates should ask friends, 
family and supporters to volunteer.  This holds 
particularly true within Conservative-facing areas, as 
supporters are more likely to volunteer if the party is 
fighting a traditional political enemy (Cutts, 2006). 
Using Local Representation as a Building Block 
to National Representation 
Smaller parties, including the Liberal Democrats, are 
often regarded as ‘politically inexperienced’ because 
they have little experience of forming a government and 
running a country.  Arguably, the party’s lack of 
governing experience was highlighted throughout the 
course of the last parliament.  They failed to keep 
various promises made within their manifesto, such as 
voting to abolish University tuition fees.  Many of the 
party’s MPs argued that they had discovered that it was 
simply not possible to keep such a promise, thus 
reflecting the differences between being an opposition 
party and a party of government. 
 
If the party is to regain voters’ trust then it will need to 
overcome the ‘politically inexperienced’ label with 
which it is associated.  Cutts (2004) found that Liberal 
Democrat performance in local government was a 
significant predictor of success in subsequent general 
elections.  Therefore the party should focus its limited 
resources upon areas where it already has some degree 
of local government representation.  The party 
successfully used this strategy during the 1990s and 
gradually voters were able to assess representatives’ 
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ability to make effective decisions and control budgets 
(Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005). 
 
Areas with councillors or long-term candidates 
generally have more volunteers and the ability to 
engage in a greater level of local campaigning.  This 
means that they can aid the electoral prospects of the 
parliamentary candidate by delivering literature, 
canvassing and mobilising supporters (Russell and 
Fieldhouse, 2005).  Cutts (2004) found that during the 
1992 and 1997 general elections in Bath, the Liberal 
Democrats were reliant upon hardworking local 
volunteers to identify and mobilise supporters to stop 
the Conservatives taking the seat.  Therefore, the 
evidence suggests that the party should continue its 
attempts to increase membership and volunteering.  
This may help them to increase their share of the vote 
and win additional seats within local elections and 
ultimately use this as a building block to winning more 
seats at the next general election. 
Targeting 
The Liberal Democrats have never had the same level of 
resources as the two main parties.  Therefore, when 
Paddy Ashdown led the party he pursued a strategy that 
involved targeting a small number of winnable seats.  
However, when Charles Kennedy took the helm in 1999 
he realised that the party needed to increase its vote 
share in non-target seats if it were to ever stand a 
realistic chance of significantly increasing its 
parliamentary representation (Cutts, 2004).  This meant 
that the party needed to focus on seats where they were 
coming third and work hard so that they may one day 
become ‘winnable’.  He aimed to win 20% of the vote 
and 50 seats in the 2001 General Election.  Such an 
approach was required when the party had over 40 MPs 
and needed to find new seats where they stood a 
realistic chance of winning.  However, now that the 
party has only 8 MPs it needs to focus its limited 
resources upon winning in a selected number of areas 
where the competitor MP has a small majority.  These 
areas include Cambridge, Eastbourne, Thornbury and 
Yate, Lewes and Twickenham (UKPR, 2015).  This 
means that the party will have a greater chance of being 
able to provide the resources required to win.  
 
In conclusion, this article discussed a number of 
campaign techniques that the Liberal Democrats may 
use within their ‘fight back’ following the 2015 General 
Election.  Many of these techniques were used 
successfully by the party in the 1990s when it was 
newly formed and seeking to develop the building 
blocks for parliamentary representation.  Such 
techniques include focusing upon local campaigning, 
particularly within Conservative-facing constituencies 
where the Liberal Democrats are close competitors; 
seeking candidates with a long-term commitment to 
campaigning and seeking election, mobilising 
volunteers that may not be formal members of the party 
and targeting areas where the party already has local 
government representation, so that it can build out from 
there.  Will the party return to a style of campaigning 
that seems to have been pushed aside in recent years?  
Only time will tell. 
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Food Banks have existed for a long time in the UK but 
the work that they do and the populations they serve 
have fallen under the radar of mainstream academic and 
policy debates in British social policy. Some of the key 
reasons for this are that Food Banks have been mainly 
run by little known faith-based organisations and 
government policy in the 2000s has been hesitant to 
shed the spotlight on them. All this changed under the 
coalition government with the shocking claims that up 
to one million people have relied at one point or another 
on food packages from charities like The Trussell Trust.  
 
The surge in media attention and the reluctant policy 
debate around Food Banks under the coalition 
government has highlighted the ever-closer re-
alignment of the British welfare system to a two-tier 
system of employment-based social security and an 
officially sanctioned system of social safety nets 
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populated in large part by charities - i..e the type of 
welfare system which exists in countries with weak or 
underdeveloped welfare states. The argument made 
here is that Food Banks are one of the best kept secrets 
of British social policy: though they are underpinned by 
the good will of a vibrant charitable sector; in the 
current political and economic climate they confirm the 
new welfare settlement within which poverty 
alleviation is to take place in the UK. This entry 
incorporates a desk review of available literature on 
food banks in the UK as well as published research 
conducted by the author among social welfare charities 
and voluntary organisations both in the UK and in the 
region of the Middle East and North Africa, with 
particular reference to organisations that have a faith-
based or religious character.   
Emergency food aid or food security? 
Though not a new phenomenon in the UK, emergency 
food provision in the form of foodbanks has helped to 
“formalise and standardise this provision and on a 
national scale” (Lambie-Mumford, 2013). The network 
of foodbanks led by The Trussel Trust has played a key 
role in this situation.   In other parts of the English-
speaking world charitable forms of welfare and social 
assistance types of programmes are more the norm, 
such as in the USA and Canada, emergency food aid has 
a more established history. Equally, readers will be most 
familiar with emergency food aid to populations 
affected by civil conflict or environmental crises further 
afield in regions such as the Middle East or Africa. Here 
too, the more common configuration for social welfare 
provision privileges the smaller proportion of formally 
employed workers (usually able-bodied men or public 
sector workers) and leaves the larger proportion of 
vulnerable member of the population or informal 
workers more dependent on forms of social assistance, 
including food aid. The evidence of the last decade in the 
UK show that the UK, though at a different level of 
welfare development, is moving in the direction of this 
two tier system. 
 
The use of emergency food aid and recourse to food 
banks has indeed increased in the UK in the last decade, 
but the evidence base on the role of food banks, the 
profile of their users or the reasons why individuals and 
families use them remains scant (Oxfam et al. 2015).  
Food banks in the UK provide food aid to people in need 
based on a system of referral by a health or social care 
professional, or other front-line agencies (Lambie-
Mumford, 2013). Food banks are run by a variety of 
voluntary and often faith-based organisations who 
themselves acquire the food donations from consumers, 
retailers and the food industry. The largest network of 
food banks in the UK is the franchise run by The Trussell 
Trust charity (Lambie-Mumford, 2013). The main 
source of data regarding food bank usage in the UK is 
The Trussell Trust Network since such data is not 
officially collected by the government. Food banks are 
also only one example of a variety of community level 
food aid projects which have proliferated in the UK in 
the last decade (Dowler and Caraher, 2003).  
 
A small number of reports discussing general trends 
were produced by Oxfam/Church Action on Poverty 
namely Walking the Breadline (2013) and Below the 
Breadline (2014) reports. These argued that the rise in 
food aid in the UK is not associated strictly with the 
growth of The Trussell Trust Network but that the 
number of meals provided by three of the main food aid 
providers (The Trussell Trust, Fareshare and Food 
Cycle) increased by over 50% between 2012/13 and 
2013/14. A desk-review by the Department of the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) argued 
that robust empirical evidence on UK food aid provision, 
and the reasons for its use, remained limited. The 
Department for Work and Pensions has also recently 
stated that there is ‘no robust evidence’ linking the 
effects of welfare reform policies to the rising use of 
food banks. But it is clearly not possible to separate 
discussion food bank use in the UK from the context of 
the current economic context which has become 
marked by higher food and fuel costs, stagnating or 
declining real wages and the continued effects of the 
economic recession.  
 
In sum, food banks are an emergency resource which 
deals with the symptoms of poverty and not its causes. 
They are an expression of the good will of voluntary 
sector organisations who are able to step in during 
times of crisis to offer direct support to those in need. 
But the growth and formalisation in British society 
reflects not only the detrimental impact of economic 
recession but the tightening of social security laws 
which are pushing citizens out of the social protection 
umbrella of the state. 
Key implications for social policy in the UK 
The issue of foodbanks is deeply linked to boarder 
debates about food security and human rights. Dowler 
and O’Connor (2012: 46) cite a recent UN rapporteur on 
food security as arguing that “by focusing on food 
experiences in the context of human rights, food poverty 
and food insecurity can be interpreted as symptoms of 
the failure of a system to ensure adequate income levels 
and the availability and affordability of healthy food.  
The dependence on food banks is ‘symptomatic of a 
broken social protection system and the failure of the 
State to meet its obligations to its people’”.  
 
These issues are also made clear in a recent joint 
report by Oxfam, Child Poverty Action Group and The 
Church of England (2015) on the perspectives of users 
of food banks in the UK where by evidence clearly 
suggests that difficulties vulnerable groups experience 
with the benefits system in the UK increase their 
dependence on food banks like The Trussel Trust.  
Factors such as having to wait for benefits, dealing with 
the impact of sanctions, experiencing delays with 
disability benefit or tax credits were cited as key 
reasons for seeking recourse in food banks. These 
factors occur against a backdrop of difficult living 
circumstances such as geographical isolation, physical 
and mental illness, caring responsibilities, difficulty 
obtaining educational qualifications or skills and 
financial indebtedness. Hence some of the key policy 
recommendations made in the Oxfam et al. (2015) 
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report include: (1) Improving access to short-term 
benefit advances; (2) Reforming sanctions policy and 
practice; (3) Improving the Employment and Support 
Allowance (ESA) regime so that help can be maintained 
when claimants are challenging a decision ; (4) 
Sustaining and improving access to emergency financial 
support; (5) Ensuring Jobcentre provides an efficient 
and more supportive service; (6) Improving access of 
benefit-users to appropriate advice and support.  
 
Food banks are an emergency measure but a clear sign 
that state social protection in the UK is increasingly 
unable or unwilling to address the challenges posed by 
an uncertain economic climate and a tough welfare 
reform agenda.  
 
Food banks have a long history in British social policy 
but their role has become more prominent in the last 
decade. Though they are underpinned by the good will 
of a vibrant charitable sector; acknowledging their role 
formally in the current political and economic climate 
confirms the new welfare settlement within which 
poverty alleviation is to take place in the UK. 
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So, that’s it then, another five years of the ‘Greenest 
Government Ever’.  Whilst many public policy sectors 
may lay claim to being within the purview of Prime 
Minister David Cameron’s famous assertion; the 
environmental management policy community, 
nominally tied to the rising and falling fortunes of the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
(Defra), has probably been impacted most by it.  
Similarly to other Governmental departments, Defra 
saw significant budgetary cuts of 17% during the last 
Parliament (Defra 2015), partly because it was not a 
ring-fenced priority department.  And considering more 
departmental ‘efficiency savings’ are on the horizon 
(Defra 2014), Defra is liable to see more cuts this 
Parliament.   
 
For one piece of policy, currently stuck in purgatory, 
this next parliament could be critical to its success or 
failure.  Biodiversity Offsetting is the mechanism 
through which environmental, or biodiversity 
degradation, caused by building new developments on 
landscapes, can be mitigated through purchasing 
compensatory sites elsewhere (Defra 2013a). Despite 
being stuck in the long grass since 2014, the original 
underlying rationale behind Biodiversity Offsetting may 
still appear to hold true.  The narrative of its 
international champions and of Owen Patterson MP, the 
former ministerial champion of Biodiversity Offsetting 
at Defra (Business and Biodiversity Offset Programme, 
unknown date), is that they offer ‘win-win outcomes’ for 
both business and biodiversity in a cost-neutral fashion.  
For the environmental management community, 
biodiversity offsets will lead to greater opportunities 
and funding to create biodiversity-rich habitats, as well 
as connect up existing sites through the ‘net gains’ of 
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ecologically coherent, landscape scale, conservation 
corridors or stepping stones.  For the development 
community, it offers certainty and risk reduction around 
conservation barriers in the planning system, which 
should help ‘cut-red-tape’ and catalyse greater private 
sector investment.  Indeed under Biodiversity Offsetting 
everyone wins, no-one loses, and best of all, it is all 
achieved without cost to the UK tax-payer, which, on 
face-value sounds like a paradigmatic governance 
instrument that we should be enthusiastically pursuing.  
 
However, at the conclusion of the last Parliament, 
Defra and the Commons Select Committee did not 
ascribe Biodiversity Offsetting as either a success or a 
failure.  They ostensibly awaited the final verdict on the 
2013 public consultation and the 2012-2014 trials 
before deciding the future of the policy, and they 
planned to publish recommendations at some point in 
the indeterminate, post-election future.  Underlying this 
were some significant undercurrents, and 
understanding these in the new parliamentary reality 
may help elucidate how likely we are to see Biodiversity 
Offsetting given firmer footing in this next parliament.   
 
Significantly, and contrary to what some may think, 
the option for developers and local authorities to 
voluntarily use Biodiversity Offsetting is here already 
(section 118 of National Planning Policy Framework, 
2012, DCLG 2012).  The problem however, is that 
nobody really knows what final form this should, and 
will, take in the UK.  Defra submitted their proposals for 
how it should look in a 2013 Green Paper (Defra 2013a), 
which was followed by a public consultation (Defra 
2013b).  This was a somewhat back-to-front 
arrangement that was suggestive of a top-down policy 
making process.  It is fair to say that the responses to 
the public consultation from a wide range of 
stakeholders wasn’t a narrative of support.  Whilst 
many in the policy community were broadly supportive 
of the business and conservation communities working 
more closely (RSPC 2013), there was a plethora of 
objections about the Green paper.  Not least amongst 
these were concerns that if the policy remained 
voluntary, then there would be the potential for it to be 
an easy additional avenue for developers to have 
multiple attempts at the planning process (ibid.).  It 
could also be used as a mechanism through which 
biodiversity rich sites are developed whilst paying lip-
service to biodiversity best-practice; or used to develop 
sites that currently enjoy special levels of protection, 
such as ancient woodlands8.  At the heart of the UK 
Biodiversity Offsetting narrative lies the contradiction, 
situated in international best-practice4, that to be 
successful at realising the conservation goals, offsetting 
schemes need to have strong, and not necessarily low-
cost governance (Treweek and Ten Kate 2014, 
McKenney and Kiesecker 2010, Tregidga 2013). 
Indeed, perhaps the most vociferous champion of 
highlighting this contradiction was the Environmental 
Audit Committee (EAC) (EAC 2013), who 
comprehensively criticised the Green paper for being 
too simplistic, and needing significant reworking.   
 
Perhaps the most likely outcome for this policy is that 
during the next Parliament Defra will re-work the Green 
paper to include many of the peripheral comments and 
concerns of the EAC, inclusive of the response to 
stakeholder consultation but, crucially, will omit 
changing it from voluntary to statutory – for all intents 
and purposes the most important element.  This is 
because despite the international growth in balanced 
Biodiversity Offsetting schemes, in the UK proposal it is 
an inherently pro-business policy instrument, which 
offers less for conservation.  Perhaps if all the 
recommendations of the EAC and policy community 
were addressed, the proposed scheme would no longer 
be unbalanced in favour of business and would actually 
function as-per balanced international best practice 
(Doswald, Barcellos, Harris, Jones, Pilla, Mulder 2012).  
However, a more balanced, statutory approach may run 
a reputational risk to the Government, of the perception 
that it is adding additional costs onto businesses, to the 
detriment of investment decisions.  In a competition of 
narratives between ‘cutting red tape for business’ 
versus ‘the Greenest Government ever’, the pro-
conservation argument is liable to lose, though it 
probably won’t be portrayed as such.  Instead, the 
consequence will probably be that the policy remains 
symbolically implemented in planning guidance 
(Business and Biodiversity Offset Programme, unknown 
date).  Due to its ecologically comprehensive, yet 
voluntary nature, it would rarely be used except in the 
direst of situations for developers, and even then only as 
a tool to re-attempt failed planning applications.  
Moreover, where it isn’t statutory, it will fail to catalyse 
the critical mass of interest to create a UK habitat 
banking market, constitute a clear opportunity for 
conservation organisations to act strategically toward it, 
or create any tangible ecologically coherent biodiversity 
gains.  In short, this coming parliament will most likely 
see Biodiversity Offsets ‘buried’ in planning guidance to 
be rarely dug up, except in cases of development 
opportunism, or in support of local development goals, 
but never in a coherent, UK-wide strategic, pro-
Biodiversity conservation format.   
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In the 1997 General Election, the Labour party won a 
landslide victory on the basis of an election campaign in 
which education sat centre stage. The General Election 
in 2015, however, could not have been more different, 
not only in terms of its outcome but also in relation to 
the topics that received the most attention. For in the 
run up to the election, education was repeatedly 
relegated, by both major political parties, behind 
seemingly more pressing and controversial issues such 
as the nature and management of our economy, 
Britain’s membership of the EU, the future of the United 
Kingdom and the problems facing our National Health 
Service. Within some parts of the education community 
– in particular those working in the school system – 
being out of the political spotlight may well have been 
accompanied by a sense of relief. For over the last five 
years, state schools in England have undergone one of 
the most significant periods of change since Thatcher’s 
Education Reform Act in 1988. The coalition 
government’s Academies and Free Schools programme 
has fundamentally altered local education landscapes, 
GCSE and A Level curriculum reform has been pushed 
through in punishingly short timescales, and a raft of 
changes have been implemented - and further changes 
are still forthcoming - to the system of public 
accountability for schools.  
 
This upheaval has unsurprisingly created a sense of 
policy fatigue amongst many parts of the teaching 
workforce, with some prominent members of the 
education community calling for an independent body 
to set the direction and pace of change for education 
policy in future (see BBC, 2015). Any hopes that the 
school system would remain outside of the political 
spotlight for any length of time have, however, been 
recently disappointed. For less than a month into the 
new parliament, the newly elected government has 
announced its plans to speed up the pace of structural 
reform: ‘failing and coasting’ schools are to face more 
rapid interventions; greater powers are to be given to 
Regional School Commissioners to turn schools into 
Academies; and a commitment has been made to open 
500 new Free Schools over the next five years (see DfE, 
2015; Cabinet office, 2015). For the majority of the 
public these changes may have little noticeable impact 
on the day-to-day education being provided to their 
children, at least in the short term. However, to those 
working within the school system, they represent 
another step along the journey towards an increasingly 
corporate and market-oriented approach to the delivery 
of education. 
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This journey has not been short-lived, for the central 
pillars of the present school ‘quasi-market’ were first 
forged by the previous Conservative government in the 
late 1980s (Glennerster, 1991). The aim then, as it 
remains today, was to break up monopolistic local 
authority provision and replace it with a competitive, 
market-based system of state-funded, autonomous 
schools (ibid.). The Education Reform Act in 1988 was 
the starting point for this political project, giving 
parents the right to express a preference for a school of 
their choice (prior to this the accepted norm was that 
children would attend their local school). This was 
combined with reforms that required local authorities 
to delegate budgets to schools via a formula largely 
based upon the numbers of pupils on their roll. Schools 
were also given the ability to opt out of local authority 
control by applying for Grant-Maintained Status, 
enabling them to receive their funding directly from 
central government. Later, Ofsted inspection reports 
and key performance indicators were made publicly 
available to enable parents to compare the performance 
of different schools in their area to inform their choice. 
The theory was that schools would become 
autonomous, self-governing institutions competing over 
their performance in order to attract pupils and funding, 
and that this would lead to more innovative practice, a 
rise in standards, and a system that is more responsive 
to parental demand.  
 
Thatcher’s reform programme did not however 
achieve all of its original aims.  In particular it did not 
reduce the role of the local authority within the school 
system to the extent that was anticipated, with the vast 
majority of schools reluctant to opt out of their control 
(Whitty, 1997). Current Conservative policy is therefore 
designed to complete this unfulfilled goal by 
encouraging, or indeed forcing, as many schools as 
possible to convert to Academy status (essentially 
Grant-Maintained status under a new name). The Free 
Schools programme - a new addition to the school 
‘quasi-market’ - is designed to strengthen the principle 
of parental choice and increase diversity within the 
school system by enabling a range of third parties to set 
up new schools, including parent groups who are 
dissatisfied with current provision in the area. In areas 
where surplus school places already exist, they also 
have the potential to intensify the competition between 
schools for pupil numbers. 
 
Meanwhile, the academic debate over the impact of 
choice and competition within the school system rages 
on, with a vast body of research literature unable to 
reach any consensus in favour or against the use of 
market mechanisms. One of the many problems with the 
search for a definitive answer to this question is that, as 
with a market-based approach to the delivery of 
education, it rests upon the assumption that we can 
accurately measure and compare school performance 
and educational standards. This raises all manner of 
questions such as: What does a high quality education 
look like? Who gets to decide? And can this be reliably 
measured? At a political level, there is rarely any serious 
engagement with these deeper philosophical questions 
about education and, perhaps as a direct result there 
has been very little opposition to the current direction 
of travel, with the previous Labour government having 
been equally complicit in the continuation of Thatcher’s 
market-oriented approach. The inability of the 
opposition to articulate any alternative vision for 
education may be one of the many reasons for the 
subject’s relegation within the General Election debates 
in 2015. As a consequence, and for the foreseeable 
future, the neo-liberal revolution in education looks 
likely to continue apace. 
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More than one in four women in England and Wales 
have suffered some form of domestic violence (Office for 
National Statistics (ONS), 2014: 1); this is compared to 
16% of men in England and Wales (ONS, 2014: 1). 
Women are also more likely to have suffered all forms of 
domestic violence than men (ONS, 2014: 1). In March 
2013, under the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition Government, the Home Office amended the 
definition of domestic violence to 'any incident or 
pattern of incidents of controlling, coercive, threatening 
behaviour, violence or abuse between those aged 16 or 
over who are, or have been, intimate partners or family 
members regardless of gender or sexuality' (Home 
Office, 2013). The inclusion of young people and 
coercive control are new additions to this definition, 
which marks a step forward. However, the new 
definition is not at all gendered, despite the gender 
disparity in official statistics, which, in some ways, 
negates the step forward made by the wider definition.  
 
More recently, the Serious Crime Bill has been 
amended to include domestic violence and to 
criminalise coercive control (House of Commons, 2015). 
Controlling violence is  ‘a range of acts designed to make 
a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating 
them from sources of support, exploiting their resources 
and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the 
means needed for independence, resistance and escape 
and regulating their everyday behaviour (House of 
Commons, 2015: 6). While coercion is ‘an act or a 
pattern of acts of assault, threats, humiliation and 
intimidation or other abuse that is used to harm, punish, 
or frighten their victim’ (House of Commons, 2015: 6). 
Stark (2007), who has written extensively about 
coercive control, explains that when both coercion and 
control are exercised, an abuser gains complete power 
over their victim. Coercive control ‘is gendered’ (Stark, 
2007: 5) and men are usually the perpetrators of 
coercive control (Johnson, 1995: 284; Johnson, 2006: 
1003; Kelly and Johnson, 2008: 482). It is inequality 
between women and men that makes coercive control 
gendered and female powerlessness, as a result of this 
inequality, helps to sustain coercive control (Stark, 
2007). But, again, this is not highlighted in definitions or 
legislation. However, the A Call to End Violence against 
Women and Girls Action Plan (Home Office, 2014a) does 
highlight that violence is gendered. This shows that the 
Coalition Government's messages were often 
contradictory. 
 
With the Conservatives winning the 2015 United 
Kingdom general election and forming a majority 
government, these contradictions look set to continue. 
The Conservative Manifesto states ‘we want to see full, 
genuine gender equality’ (Conservatives, 2015: 19) and 
‘we will prioritise tackling violence against women and 
girls’ (Conservatives, 2015: 59), but if more than one in 
four women have suffered some form of domestic 
violence, which is disproportionate to the number of 
men, does it not seem obvious that domestic violence is 
a gendered problem? The Home Office definition of 
domestic violence should reflect the gendered nature of 
this form of violence to show that domestic violence is a 
prominent form of violence against women and girls. 
 
Then there is the issue of the cuts. The Conservatives 
have promised to continue in their reduction of public 
spending, suggesting that they will make £10 billion 
worth of savings over the next few years (Conservatives, 
2015). If the last five years are anything to go by, this 
will have dire consequences for women who have 
suffered domestic violence. Under the coalition 
Government, the Home Office did set aside £28 million 
for ‘specialist domestic and sexual violence services’ 
(House of Commons, 2015: 9). However, due to the 
reduction in government spending, cuts to local 
government budgets has meant women’s refuges, which 
specialise in accommodation and care for women and 
children who have been victims of domestic violence, 
have experienced ‘devastating budget cuts’ (Women’s 
Aid, 2014a). This has meant that 1 in 3 women are being 
sent away from refuges as refuges just do not have the 
resources to accommodate for the number of women 
who need their services (Women’s Aid, 2014b). Deeper 
cuts in this parliament could well mean that even more 
woman and children will be turned away and, quite 
possibly, it could be the end of these vital services 
altogether. Although the national Government claims 
that refuges are local governments’ concern, a 
government that does not protect vital services for 
domestic violence victims and survivors is not a 
government that prioritises tackling violence against 
women and girls or gender equality. 
 
There have also been cuts to legal aid which are not 
likely to be repealed over the next five years. Legal aid is 
public funding that can be used to ‘help meet the costs 
of legal advice, family mediation and representation in a 
court or tribunal’, if an individual does not have the 
funds available to them (UK Government, 2015). Victims 
and survivors of domestic violence can now only obtain 
legal aid if they can provide evidence of this violence 
(UK Government, 2015). This creates more 
contradictions. Many behaviours which constitute 
coercive control are often hidden or difficult to prove. 
The Government itself recognises that coercive control 
‘may appear innocent, but the cumulative impact on the 
victim’s every-day life will be significant, causing the 
victim to feel fear, alarm or distress’ (Home Office, 
2014b: 11). It makes absolutely no sense at all to 
criminalise coercive control, while blocking avenues to 
the only source of legal funding that many women who 
experience this violence depend on in order to 
successfully prosecute their abuser. 
 
Stark (2007) asserts that gender equality is the only 
way to combat coercive control. With the Conservative 
Government set to continue with the Coalition 
Government’s contradictory messages surrounding 
gender and domestic violence, whilst leaving vital 
services and resources for domestic violence sufferers 
unprotected, the likelihood of making moves towards 
eradicating coercive control and gender inequality over 
the next five years does not look promising.    
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The Euro: past, 
present and future 
 
  Bruce Morley 
Bruce Morley joined the University of Bath’s 
Economics Department in 2006, having 
previously been an Economics lecturer at the 
University of Wales Aberystwyth for about ten 
years. His PhD, Masters and degree were from 
the Department of Economics at Loughborough 
University. Bruce’s main research interests are 
in international macroeconomics, particularly 
models of exchange rate determination. In 
addition, He is also interested in the economics 
of the EU, especially the effects of monetary 
union. He also has an interest in the 
macroeconomic aspects of the environment and 
Sport Economics, in particular relating to 
Cricket. 
 
One of the most important current political issues is the 
performance of the European single currency (Euro). 
Although the UK is not a member, decisions taken in the 
Eurozone will have wide raging effects on the UK 
economy and currency over the next five years. 
Depending on how the Euro fares, it potentially could 
affect the UK to a greater extent than the economic 
policies of the UK political parties, including how fast 
the budget deficit is reduced and future levels of 
economic growth. For this reason it is important to 
assess the causes of the Euro’s current problems and 
what may happen over the next five years. 
 
The European single currency was set up in 1999, with 
notes and coins being distributed in 2002. Before the 
Euro was created, all potential members were required 
to join the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM). 
This was a pegged exchange rate regime, where 
exchange rates were allowed to vary by small amounts 
(2.25%) around a par value. The ERM in effect collapsed 
in 1993, after the UK and Italy were forced to leave in 
1992, following a series of speculative attacks on 
individual currencies. After 1993, the ERM remained but 
with much wider bands of plus or minus 15%. 
 
In order to join the single currency all potential 
members first needed to pass the Maastricht criteria. 
There were 5 criteria in all, relating to interest rates, 
inflation, government debt and deficits as well as the 
need for ERM membership for at least two years prior to 
joining the Euro. These were meant to ensure 
convergence across the member state’s economies to 
encourage stability across the Eurozone. All those who 
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applied to join passed these criteria, except Greece, who 
were allowed to join in 2001. 
 
The criteria which most affect the current and future 
viability of the Eurozone are the budget deficit and stock 
of sovereign debt built up over previous years. The 
Maastricht criteria required that a country’s budget 
deficit should not exceed 3% of GDP per annum and the 
outstanding debt should not exceed 60% of GDP per 
annum. Most of the members struggled to meet this 
latter requirement, with both Belgium and Italy having 
approximately 120% of total government debt relative 
to its annual GDP. 
 
A requirement for continued membership of the Euro, 
was that all member states keep their budget deficits 
within 3% of annual GDP. Most of the members 
including Germany have at some time failed to comply 
with this, particularly after the financial crisis in 2008. 
Some have argued that this requirement is lacking in 
flexibility and should vary across the business cycle. In 
addition any member who failed to meet this rule in 
theory would be fined, however as the fine would come 
from public funds, this would have meant failing the 
criteria by even more, so no members have ever been 
fined. 
 
Until recently the Euro had done well against the 
dollar, but there has been a sharp decline in its value 
against the dollar in recent months. There is evidence 
that as the probability of the Euro collapse increases, so 
the Euro falls in value and the financial and political 
problems encountered by Greece recently have 
increased the likelihood of a member state leaving. So 
far Greece, Ireland and Portugal have required bailout 
funds and the European Central Bank has intervened in 
the sovereign debt markets. Greece earlier on suffered a 
partial default on its debts (roughly 50% of bank held 
debts) and currently Greece is seeking to renegotiate its 
debt obligations. 
 
Short-term solutions to the economic problems of the 
Eurozone involve continued intervention in the bond 
markets and quantitative easing, which itself includes 
buying sovereign bonds which supports their price and 
reduces their return. However a long-term solution will 
require more fundamental change to the Eurozone and 
could include a fiscal union among the member states. A 
fiscal union would involve central control over 
government spending and possibly taxation, which 
would enable a far greater level of control to be 
maintained over individual member state’s spending. 
The main disadvantage of a fiscal union is that it limits 
flexibility and the ability of individual countries to 
control their own economies to the benefit of their 
citizens. Monetary union has involved the loss of 
monetary policy to control member’s economies as well 
as the option of devaluing the exchange rate. the only 
policy tool they have left is fiscal policy, but fiscal and 
monetary policy tend to be closely interlinked, so it is 
difficult to control one without control of the other. 
 
If closer economic union is not acceptable to the 
members of the Eurozone, the other possibility is to 
break up the Euro and for one or more members to 
return to their domestic currencies. But there are 
potential problems with this option, including legal 
problems. For instance, what currency would the 
departing country’s debt be denominated in? More 
potential defaults on debt following a country leaving 
the Euro, could affect the whole EU banking system, as 
they hold some of the sovereign debt. This could 
potentially create a financial crisis, as the Banks could 
have to write off the value of much of this debt against 
their capital, creating the possibility of bank collapses 
 
The UK exchange rate has also fallen against the dollar 
in recent months, following the falls in the Euro. The UK 
economy and exchange rate appears to be falling in 
sympathy with the Euro, reflecting the economic and 
financial links between the UK and Eurozone. However 
the fall in the value of the UK currency could be an 
advantage, as this could benefit UK exports and 
therefore GDP. So the immediate consequences of the 
Euro’s problems could benefit the UK in the coming 
months and years, but if the Euro and the Eurozone 
continue to suffer from economic and political 
difficulties, leading to the collapse of the Euro, it would 
have severe implications for the UK economy. 
 
Predictions about the performance of the Euro over 
the coming years vary, but many are suggesting it is not 
tenable in its current form, Alan Greenspan, the former 
head of the Federal Reserve in the USA recently 
suggested in a BBC interview that: "The problem is that 
there is no way that I can conceive of the Euro 
continuing, unless and until all of the members of the 
Eurozone become politically integrated - actually even 
just fiscally integrated won't do it.” (BBC, 2015). 
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Leaning towards the 
East: the development 
of Sino-British 
relations in Cameron’s 
second term 
 
  Biao Zhang 
Biao Zhang obtained a LLB from Peking 
University (2009), a Master in International 
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Relations from the University of Warwick 
(2010) and a Doctor of Philosophy in Politics 
from the University of Exeter (2014). His PhD 
thesis examines the various conceptions of 
rationality by Anglophone IR theorists from a 
historical perspective. He is interested in IR 
Theory, Philosophy of History and Social 
Sciences, and British Foreign Policy. 
 
During David Cameron’s first term, Britain lost China 
but soon won her back. The beginning was gauche. In 
2010 Cameron visited China but was rebuffed because 
he raised human rights issues. In 2011 the potential 
Anglo-American intervention into the Syrian Civil War 
made the Chinese government uneasy. In 2012 
Cameron’s meeting with Dalai Lama enraged Beijing 
despite the latter’s constant warning. A turning point, 
nevertheless, occurred in 2013. Cameron tried to woo 
China by sending another delegation. In return, the 
Premier Li Keqiang visited London to sort out trading 
arrangements, holding a controversial meeting with the 
Queen. In 2014 Cameron tackled the protest in Hong 
Kong with due consideration of Beijing’s feelings. In 
2015 UK support of the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank (AIIB) against American advice pleased Beijing.   
 
With the re-election of Cameron as the Prime Minister, 
the Sino-British relations will at least continue on the 
present track. None of the thorny issues for Cameron 
looming in the future will involve China. The issues of 
NHS, taxation and Scottish independence are too 
domestic to entail China. The referendum on EU, the 
radicalization of British Muslims, the Ukraine crisis and 
the insecurity felt about Russian military force does not 
entail China either. The only impediment that may 
freeze the Sino-British relations – the Hong Kong 
protestors and general human rights issues – is unlikely 
to emerge since Cameron has spent three years learning 
how to cope with Beijing. The Prime Minister is now 
very clear that a realistic, business-like, conduct 
towards China suits the latter best.  
 
But it seems that in his second term Cameron will not 
merely keep Sino-British relations where they are but 
rather take it to a new stage. Cameron will strengthen 
his relationship with China for two reasons. First, 
Cameron demonstrated his determination in the case of 
AIIB to pursue Britain’s own interest. His decision to let 
the Exchequer’s will prevail over Foreign Secretary 
Philip Hammond’s advice gestured a crystal-clear signal: 
Cameron did not want American security concerns to 
override the British economic interest. The decision was 
applauded by Beijing. The Chinese government had 
reiterated its dislike of the politicization of economic 
cooperation, and Cameron’s decision liquidated the 
suspicion. Whether Cameron’s decision is a political 
commitment to Beijing is extremely hard to say. Some 
Chinese statesmen and scholars read it as a signal of 
embracing Beijing and abandoning Washington. But it is 
clear that as long as there are complementary interest 
between China and Britain in exchanging investment for 
high-tech medical and environmental goods and 
management experiences, and as long as the Prime 
Minister cares more about this than he does about the 
American reaction, the Sino-British cooperation will 
continue to develop without any hindrance.  
 
Second, and paradoxically, Cameron will endeavor to 
remedy the Anglo-American relation while at the same 
time improving the British relation with China. The 
Financial Times suggested on May 1st that the “White 
House no longer sees anything special in UK relations”. 
The White House may cease to see Britain as special but 
Britain cannot afford to do the same to the US: Britain 
needs American involvement in Europe (in the current 
situation with Russia) and cooperation in the Middle 
East (the Syrian war). Hence in his second term, 
Cameron will have to sooner or later remedy Anglo-
American relations. But the paradox is this: once 
Cameron placates Washington’s skepticism and anger, 
he must at the same time show to Beijing that London 
remains faithful and will not follow Washington’s lead 
so closely. But how can Cameron demonstrate his 
commitment to Beijing? Only by more extensive 
cooperation. 
 
In his second term Cameron will lean towards China. 
Leaning towards China is not a change of strategic 
partner. It is impossible to envision Britain embracing 
China in the Sino-American struggle for world 
leadership. But it is now clear that Cameron is moving 
closer to Beijing. The prospect of Sino-British 
cooperation in commercial and social realms will be 
very bright. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
SWDTC Student  
Summer Event 
Monday 29 June 2015, University of Exeter 
 
14:30-16:00 University of Exeter Campus Sculpture Trail 
16:00-17:30 ‘Food Matters’ Talk, Tasters & Discussion 
17:30-20:00 BBQ & drinks 
 
RSVP to swdtc.studentreps@gmail.com by Monday 22 June 
14:15  
Meet outside Library, Stocker Road (#1 on the campus map) 
 
14:30-16:00 
Sculpture Trail 
Tour of the 36 sculptures around the campus, led by the student reps. The trail 
includes sculptures by world-renowned artists including Dame Barbara Hepworth 
and Peter Randall-Page. 
 
16:00-17:30 
‘Food Matters’ Talk, Tasters & Discussion 
XFi Building (#30 on the campus map) 
Exeter students will give an interactive talk on food and local produce (interactive 
as this will involve eating things!), talking to both materiality and viscerality in 
research. 
 
17:30-20:00 
BBQ & drinks 
XFi Building (#30 on the campus map) 
Round off the day with some much-deserved food and drink! 
